supply chain event / NVI-00008600 / Revision 1
Malicious code in black-spindle-2 (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for black-spindle-2, black-spindle-2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
black-spindle-2
source listed= 301.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (433228fbed18f3104fed4cd1bce59bc5a76b8ea061d18c8fc9516c92b6b26e90) package.json declares a postinstall script that runs curl against the ephemeral host http://778e-181-63-25-28.ngrok-free.app over plain HTTP, embedding a shell command-substitution expression in the URL path. The script fires automatically on npm install, confirming installation on the installer's machine and providing a channel to exfiltrate host or environment values via the expanded shell expression. The shipped index.js is an empty stub, so the manifest's postinstall beacon is the package's entire effect. The destination is an anonymous ngrok-free.app tunnel with no relationship to any legitimate publisher, consistent with a dependency-confusion or install-confirmation probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF (source)
black-spindle-2
source listed= 100.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (433228fbed18f3104fed4cd1bce59bc5a76b8ea061d18c8fc9516c92b6b26e90) package.json declares a postinstall script that runs curl against the ephemeral host http://778e-181-63-25-28.ngrok-free.app over plain HTTP, embedding a shell command-substitution expression in the URL path. The script fires automatically on npm install, confirming installation on the installer's machine and providing a channel to exfiltrate host or environment values via the expanded shell expression. The shipped index.js is an empty stub, so the manifest's postinstall beacon is the package's entire effect. The destination is an anonymous ngrok-free.app tunnel with no relationship to any legitimate publisher, consistent with a dependency-confusion or install-confirmation probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF (source)
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-qcg8-4xw5-5ccq ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.