supply chain event / NVI-00008614 / Revision 1
Malicious code in publish-poc-base (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for publish-poc-base. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
publish-poc-base
source listed= 1.0.7
## Source: amazon-inspector (9bf2f71038e46898cc03f9bf5081547bb6d725e6a480ef22b80f4dc259c721d9) On install, the postinstall script in package.json reads the first line of../../README.md from the installer's parent workspace, creates a mktemp directory, writes a generated package.json named publish-poc-found- using that README content as its description, and writes an.npmrc containing a hardcoded npm registry _authToken (prefix npm_DLcrGeNT…) pointing at //registry.npmjs.org/. The staged directory is removed with rm -rf before any publish or network call fires, so this version does not itself execute the publish step, but the shipped token is distributed in cleartext to every installer and the staging logic is a working template for auto-publishing packages under the token owner's identity using data harvested from the installer's workspace. The combination of a live third-party-usable publish credential distributed to all installers plus install-time reads of files outside the package directory raises installer-impacting supply-chain concerns beyond author self-harm: any installer receives the token, and any installer's local README content is read at install time. --- Credi
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-35j9-6ggx-3fcq ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.