supply chain event / NVI-00008665 / Revision 1
Malicious code in poc-revshell (PyPI)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for poc-revshell. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
poc-revshell
source listed= 0.1.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (08edc162927c80cde9e467244a435780f65ca95823e97ec73534faf34233ac9a) poc-revshell 0.1.0 ships a reverse-shell backdoor that fires both at install time and at import time. setup.py registers a custom `install` cmdclass (PostInstall) that starts a daemon thread executing a routine which opens a TCP socket to 127.0.0.1:4444, dup2s the socket file descriptor onto stdin/stdout/stderr, and execs `/bin/sh -i` (or `cmd.exe` on Windows); this runs automatically during `pip install`. The package's `__init__.py` contains the same thread-launch at module top level, so every `import poc_revshell` repeats the handoff. Any local listener on port 4444 at the moment of install or import receives a full interactive shell running under the installing user's identity. The destination is hardcoded loopback, which confines the attack to a co-resident attacker on the installer's host, but the install-time and import-time network-to-shell dataflow is a backdoor by structure, matching the package's self-description as a proof-of-concept that triggers a reverse shell on pip install. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/oss
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-h7h9-fmhv-56wh ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.