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supply chain event / NVI-00008681 / Revision 1

Malicious code in @sudobility/testomniac_client (npm)

GitHub lists this malware advisory for @sudobility/testomniac_client. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-58jf-66x8-7q28

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

@sudobility/testomniac_client

source listed
  • = 0.0.131

## Source: amazon-inspector (42a9a6e0fb008dcc30d7f8a1c7f60a0dc47a941d2790d211cce968bb6726ced3) The package declares a postinstall hook that executes scripts/miner.sh on every npm install. The script downloads a gzip payload from amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com (using an embedded AWS access key and a signed URL), writes it to /tmp/.smh / /tmp/.smi, and either executes it as a persistent agent via passwordless sudo or extracts a bundled bin/miner-linux-amd64 binary and launches it under a randomized system-component-like process name using nohup. The agent branch is described in the script as installing stealth-renamed persistence with cron and a relay/tor channel, and the miner is configured to connect to the XMRig pool at networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 with a hardcoded Monero wallet. The package's advertised purpose is a TanStack Query client, which is unrelated to any of this behavior. All of the above executes automatically as root (when passwordless sudo is available) or as the installing user on a default npm install. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/bl

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-58jf-66x8-7q28 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

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