supply chain event / NVI-00008719 / Revision 1
Malicious code in md-to-slides (PyPI)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for md-to-slides, md-to-slides, md-to-slides, md-to-slides. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
md-to-slides
source listed= 0.1.0
## Source: kam193 (b11c84f48dc5185cf83056d55f0b2fa64fa415afae3f258baa5887c1ce44bc7c) In this campaign, specific versions of involved affected packages hide malicious actions. The malicious code is hidden in specific versions of a dependency (is-it-ai), intentionally pinned by specific versions of dependent packages. All package versions were uploaded with malicious intention; the ones without malicious references are clearly intendent only to hide a cover for the rest. When triggered, the malicious action fingerprints the environment and contacts the remote server. If it responds with an URL, it will be downloaded and executed. The malicious code trigger is in 0.1.1, other releases are just to cover it. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-10-is-it-ai Reasons (based on the campaign): - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - The malicious code is intentionally included in a dependency of the package - targetted-attack - action-hidden-in-lib-usage --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/c89f77f3af8e15ab4533f
md-to-slides
source listed= 0.1.1
## Source: kam193 (b11c84f48dc5185cf83056d55f0b2fa64fa415afae3f258baa5887c1ce44bc7c) In this campaign, specific versions of involved affected packages hide malicious actions. The malicious code is hidden in specific versions of a dependency (is-it-ai), intentionally pinned by specific versions of dependent packages. All package versions were uploaded with malicious intention; the ones without malicious references are clearly intendent only to hide a cover for the rest. When triggered, the malicious action fingerprints the environment and contacts the remote server. If it responds with an URL, it will be downloaded and executed. The malicious code trigger is in 0.1.1, other releases are just to cover it. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-10-is-it-ai Reasons (based on the campaign): - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - The malicious code is intentionally included in a dependency of the package - targetted-attack - action-hidden-in-lib-usage --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/c89f77f3af8e15ab4533f
md-to-slides
source listed= 0.1.2
## Source: kam193 (b11c84f48dc5185cf83056d55f0b2fa64fa415afae3f258baa5887c1ce44bc7c) In this campaign, specific versions of involved affected packages hide malicious actions. The malicious code is hidden in specific versions of a dependency (is-it-ai), intentionally pinned by specific versions of dependent packages. All package versions were uploaded with malicious intention; the ones without malicious references are clearly intendent only to hide a cover for the rest. When triggered, the malicious action fingerprints the environment and contacts the remote server. If it responds with an URL, it will be downloaded and executed. The malicious code trigger is in 0.1.1, other releases are just to cover it. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-10-is-it-ai Reasons (based on the campaign): - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - The malicious code is intentionally included in a dependency of the package - targetted-attack - action-hidden-in-lib-usage --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/c89f77f3af8e15ab4533f
md-to-slides
source listed= 0.1.3
## Source: kam193 (b11c84f48dc5185cf83056d55f0b2fa64fa415afae3f258baa5887c1ce44bc7c) In this campaign, specific versions of involved affected packages hide malicious actions. The malicious code is hidden in specific versions of a dependency (is-it-ai), intentionally pinned by specific versions of dependent packages. All package versions were uploaded with malicious intention; the ones without malicious references are clearly intendent only to hide a cover for the rest. When triggered, the malicious action fingerprints the environment and contacts the remote server. If it responds with an URL, it will be downloaded and executed. The malicious code trigger is in 0.1.1, other releases are just to cover it. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-10-is-it-ai Reasons (based on the campaign): - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - The malicious code is intentionally included in a dependency of the package - targetted-attack - action-hidden-in-lib-usage --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/c89f77f3af8e15ab4533f
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-7p4v-mm6f-8g5c ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.