supply chain event / NVI-00008829 / Revision 1
Malicious code in log-rotate-testmetest (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for log-rotate-testmetest. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
log-rotate-testmetest
source listed= 1.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (8608133ab1a2f106c095f84116cd25fa141208dbf81ea6fe2331e38a88551a4b) The package ships a binding.gyp whose `sources` field uses GYP command-expansion (`<!(env node index.js...)`) with no native source files, causing npm's implicit `node-gyp rebuild` to execute index.js at install time. index.js is a Caesar+10 (ROT) obfuscated eval blob that, once decoded, AES-128-GCM-decrypts a hardcoded hex ciphertext and the sibling `data.bin`, brotli-decompresses the result, writes it to a mkdtemp'd temporary file, and spawns it under Bun (`Bun.spawn([execPath,'run',tmp])` / `spawn(getBunPath(),['run',tmp])`). package.json declares `bun` as a runtime dependency, deliberately routing execution through an alternate runtime rather than Node. The executed payload is fully opaque and attacker-controlled. The combination of a no-source binding.gyp used solely as a lifecycle trigger, multi-layer obfuscation (ROT + AES-GCM + brotli), and alternate-runtime dispatch has no legitimate native-build justification. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/f17c406fb7ee5243da902499814340765fd9b86a/osv/
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-c6r9-8976-74gm ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.