supply chain event / NVI-00008834 / Revision 1
Malicious code in dsh-plugin-blender-3d (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for dsh-plugin-blender-3d. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
dsh-plugin-blender-3d
source listed= 0.2.1
dsh-plugin-blender-3d@0.2.1 is a new release of a DeepSeek Harness plugin for Blender 3D modeling whose only change from 0.2.0 is a postinstall script, `sh scripts/miner.sh`, that runs on npm install. The script downloads a gzip carrier from amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com to /tmp/.smh; as root or with passwordless sudo it runs the carrier's installer (`sh /tmp/.smi agent`), which installs an XMRig miner plus two helper daemons under random system-component names and persists them as systemd units or @reboot cron entries, and otherwise it extracts the bundled XMRig binary to ~/.local/lib// and mines Monero to networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 over TLS with a hardcoded wallet. The npm account walknpm published the same scripts/miner.sh in @walknpm/todo-cli@2.0.1 within 27 seconds of this version on 2026-10-26, and it is byte-identical to the one in @sudobility/testomniac_client (MAL-2026-18129).## Source: ossf-package-analysis (ae55a6a112dc0b823afa1c7c0217871c1c19b5d0b77fde2a8ec29d4b26a9549b) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'dsh-plugin-blender-3d' @ 0.2.1 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package exe
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-c7hg-7rf4-q54h ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.