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vulnerability / NVI-00008869 / Revision 2

@better-auth/drizzle-adapter: Concurrent requests can exceed rate limits on PostgreSQL

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @better-auth/drizzle-adapter, @better-auth/kysely-adapter, better-auth. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-44jh-23m7-hpcfCVE-2026-110861

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

3.7 low

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

@better-auth/drizzle-adapter

source listed
  • >= 1.6.17, < 1.7.7

## Am I affected? You are affected if you use `@better-auth/drizzle-adapter` from 1.6.17 through versions before 1.7.7 (including the 1.7.0 prereleases from beta.6 through rc.6) or `@better-auth/kysely-adapter` 1.6.17 through 1.6.31, and keep rate-limit records in a PostgreSQL database. All of these must be true: - Rate limiting is enabled. - Rate-limit records are stored in the database. - The database is PostgreSQL, used through one of the adapter versions above. You are not affected if you store rate-limit records in memory (the default) or in secondary storage. ## Summary Database-backed rate limiting on PostgreSQL can let a burst of concurrent requests go over the configured maximum. When many requests arrive at the same time, several of them can pass the limit check together. This weakens the rate limit on password sign-in, two-factor verification, one-time codes, password resets, and other rate-limited endpoints. ## Impact An attacker who sends many requests at once can make more attempts than the application allows. The issue does not bypass password or one-time-code validation. It does not directly compromise an account. The number of extra attempts is limited by

GitHub Advisory Database

@better-auth/kysely-adapter

source listed
  • >= 1.6.17, < 1.7.0

## Am I affected? You are affected if you use `@better-auth/drizzle-adapter` from 1.6.17 through versions before 1.7.7 (including the 1.7.0 prereleases from beta.6 through rc.6) or `@better-auth/kysely-adapter` 1.6.17 through 1.6.31, and keep rate-limit records in a PostgreSQL database. All of these must be true: - Rate limiting is enabled. - Rate-limit records are stored in the database. - The database is PostgreSQL, used through one of the adapter versions above. You are not affected if you store rate-limit records in memory (the default) or in secondary storage. ## Summary Database-backed rate limiting on PostgreSQL can let a burst of concurrent requests go over the configured maximum. When many requests arrive at the same time, several of them can pass the limit check together. This weakens the rate limit on password sign-in, two-factor verification, one-time codes, password resets, and other rate-limited endpoints. ## Impact An attacker who sends many requests at once can make more attempts than the application allows. The issue does not bypass password or one-time-code validation. It does not directly compromise an account. The number of extra attempts is limited by

GitHub Advisory Database

better-auth

source listed
  • >= 1.6.17, < 1.7.7

## Am I affected? You are affected if you use `@better-auth/drizzle-adapter` from 1.6.17 through versions before 1.7.7 (including the 1.7.0 prereleases from beta.6 through rc.6) or `@better-auth/kysely-adapter` 1.6.17 through 1.6.31, and keep rate-limit records in a PostgreSQL database. All of these must be true: - Rate limiting is enabled. - Rate-limit records are stored in the database. - The database is PostgreSQL, used through one of the adapter versions above. You are not affected if you store rate-limit records in memory (the default) or in secondary storage. ## Summary Database-backed rate limiting on PostgreSQL can let a burst of concurrent requests go over the configured maximum. When many requests arrive at the same time, several of them can pass the limit check together. This weakens the rate limit on password sign-in, two-factor verification, one-time codes, password resets, and other rate-limited endpoints. ## Impact An attacker who sends many requests at once can make more attempts than the application allows. The issue does not bypass password or one-time-code validation. It does not directly compromise an account. The number of extra attempts is limited by

GitHub Advisory Database

@better-auth/drizzle-adapter

source listed
  • SEMVER: introduced 1.6.17; fixed 1.7.7

## Am I affected? You are affected if you use `@better-auth/drizzle-adapter` from 1.6.17 through versions before 1.7.7 (including the 1.7.0 prereleases from beta.6 through rc.6) or `@better-auth/kysely-adapter` 1.6.17 through 1.6.31, and keep rate-limit records in a PostgreSQL database. All of these must be true: - Rate limiting is enabled. - Rate-limit records are stored in the database. - The database is PostgreSQL, used through one of the adapter versions above. You are not affected if you store rate-limit records in memory (the default) or in secondary storage. ## Summary Database-backed rate limiting on PostgreSQL can let a burst of concurrent requests go over the configured maximum. When many requests arrive at the same time, several of them can pass the limit check together. This weakens the rate limit on password sign-in, two-factor verification, one-time codes, password resets, and other rate-limited endpoints. ## Impact An attacker who sends many requests at once can make more attempts than the application allows. The issue does not bypass password or one-time-code validation. It does not directly compromise an account. The number of extra attempts is limited by

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

@better-auth/kysely-adapter

source listed
  • SEMVER: introduced 1.6.17; fixed 1.7.0

## Am I affected? You are affected if you use `@better-auth/drizzle-adapter` from 1.6.17 through versions before 1.7.7 (including the 1.7.0 prereleases from beta.6 through rc.6) or `@better-auth/kysely-adapter` 1.6.17 through 1.6.31, and keep rate-limit records in a PostgreSQL database. All of these must be true: - Rate limiting is enabled. - Rate-limit records are stored in the database. - The database is PostgreSQL, used through one of the adapter versions above. You are not affected if you store rate-limit records in memory (the default) or in secondary storage. ## Summary Database-backed rate limiting on PostgreSQL can let a burst of concurrent requests go over the configured maximum. When many requests arrive at the same time, several of them can pass the limit check together. This weakens the rate limit on password sign-in, two-factor verification, one-time codes, password resets, and other rate-limited endpoints. ## Impact An attacker who sends many requests at once can make more attempts than the application allows. The issue does not bypass password or one-time-code validation. It does not directly compromise an account. The number of extra attempts is limited by

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

better-auth

source listed
  • SEMVER: introduced 1.6.17; fixed 1.7.7

## Am I affected? You are affected if you use `@better-auth/drizzle-adapter` from 1.6.17 through versions before 1.7.7 (including the 1.7.0 prereleases from beta.6 through rc.6) or `@better-auth/kysely-adapter` 1.6.17 through 1.6.31, and keep rate-limit records in a PostgreSQL database. All of these must be true: - Rate limiting is enabled. - Rate-limit records are stored in the database. - The database is PostgreSQL, used through one of the adapter versions above. You are not affected if you store rate-limit records in memory (the default) or in secondary storage. ## Summary Database-backed rate limiting on PostgreSQL can let a burst of concurrent requests go over the configured maximum. When many requests arrive at the same time, several of them can pass the limit check together. This weakens the rate limit on password sign-in, two-factor verification, one-time codes, password resets, and other rate-limited endpoints. ## Impact An attacker who sends many requests at once can make more attempts than the application allows. The issue does not bypass password or one-time-code validation. It does not directly compromise an account. The number of extra attempts is limited by

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

  2. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.7.7 for @better-auth/drizzle-adapter. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  3. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.7.0 for @better-auth/kysely-adapter. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  4. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.7.7 for better-auth. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-44jh-23m7-hpcf ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. GHSA-44jh-23m7-hpcf ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 2 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  2. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗