vulnerability / NVI-00008871 / Revision 2
MCP TypeScript SDK: HTTP server transports and handlers did not limit request body size or JSON-RPC batch length
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, @modelcontextprotocol/server, @modelcontextprotocol/node, @modelcontextprotocol/hono. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk
source listed>= 1.10.0, < 1.30.1
### Summary In affected versions, MCP servers reachable over HTTP put no limit on the size of a POST body or on the number of messages in a JSON-RPC batch. Large requests could exhaust the server's memory, and one long batch could block it from serving anyone else. No credentials were needed, unless your application authenticates requests before they reach the SDK. ### Am I affected? Yes, if clients you do not fully trust can reach your server over Streamable HTTP. A body parser such as `express.json()` does not protect you, because it does not limit batch length. Servers that only use stdio are not affected. Affected versions: - `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.10.0 through 1.30.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.0 ### Fix Upgrade to: - 1.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.30.1 or later - 2.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.1.0, `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.1.0 and `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.1 or later. Upgrade every one you have installed. Bodies over 4 MiB now get `413`, and batches over 100 messages get `400`. If your clients send larger bodies, raise the new `maxRequestBodySize` option. I
@modelcontextprotocol/server
source listed>= 2.0.0, < 2.1.0
### Summary In affected versions, MCP servers reachable over HTTP put no limit on the size of a POST body or on the number of messages in a JSON-RPC batch. Large requests could exhaust the server's memory, and one long batch could block it from serving anyone else. No credentials were needed, unless your application authenticates requests before they reach the SDK. ### Am I affected? Yes, if clients you do not fully trust can reach your server over Streamable HTTP. A body parser such as `express.json()` does not protect you, because it does not limit batch length. Servers that only use stdio are not affected. Affected versions: - `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.10.0 through 1.30.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.0 ### Fix Upgrade to: - 1.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.30.1 or later - 2.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.1.0, `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.1.0 and `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.1 or later. Upgrade every one you have installed. Bodies over 4 MiB now get `413`, and batches over 100 messages get `400`. If your clients send larger bodies, raise the new `maxRequestBodySize` option. I
@modelcontextprotocol/node
source listed>= 2.0.0, < 2.1.0
### Summary In affected versions, MCP servers reachable over HTTP put no limit on the size of a POST body or on the number of messages in a JSON-RPC batch. Large requests could exhaust the server's memory, and one long batch could block it from serving anyone else. No credentials were needed, unless your application authenticates requests before they reach the SDK. ### Am I affected? Yes, if clients you do not fully trust can reach your server over Streamable HTTP. A body parser such as `express.json()` does not protect you, because it does not limit batch length. Servers that only use stdio are not affected. Affected versions: - `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.10.0 through 1.30.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.0 ### Fix Upgrade to: - 1.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.30.1 or later - 2.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.1.0, `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.1.0 and `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.1 or later. Upgrade every one you have installed. Bodies over 4 MiB now get `413`, and batches over 100 messages get `400`. If your clients send larger bodies, raise the new `maxRequestBodySize` option. I
@modelcontextprotocol/hono
source listed>= 2.0.0, < 2.0.1
### Summary In affected versions, MCP servers reachable over HTTP put no limit on the size of a POST body or on the number of messages in a JSON-RPC batch. Large requests could exhaust the server's memory, and one long batch could block it from serving anyone else. No credentials were needed, unless your application authenticates requests before they reach the SDK. ### Am I affected? Yes, if clients you do not fully trust can reach your server over Streamable HTTP. A body parser such as `express.json()` does not protect you, because it does not limit batch length. Servers that only use stdio are not affected. Affected versions: - `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.10.0 through 1.30.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.0 ### Fix Upgrade to: - 1.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.30.1 or later - 2.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.1.0, `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.1.0 and `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.1 or later. Upgrade every one you have installed. Bodies over 4 MiB now get `413`, and batches over 100 messages get `400`. If your clients send larger bodies, raise the new `maxRequestBodySize` option. I
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk
source listedSEMVER: introduced 1.10.0; fixed 1.30.1
### Summary In affected versions, MCP servers reachable over HTTP put no limit on the size of a POST body or on the number of messages in a JSON-RPC batch. Large requests could exhaust the server's memory, and one long batch could block it from serving anyone else. No credentials were needed, unless your application authenticates requests before they reach the SDK. ### Am I affected? Yes, if clients you do not fully trust can reach your server over Streamable HTTP. A body parser such as `express.json()` does not protect you, because it does not limit batch length. Servers that only use stdio are not affected. Affected versions: - `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.10.0 through 1.30.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.0 ### Fix Upgrade to: - 1.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.30.1 or later - 2.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.1.0, `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.1.0 and `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.1 or later. Upgrade every one you have installed. Bodies over 4 MiB now get `413`, and batches over 100 messages get `400`. If your clients send larger bodies, raise the new `maxRequestBodySize` option. I
@modelcontextprotocol/server
source listedSEMVER: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.1.0
### Summary In affected versions, MCP servers reachable over HTTP put no limit on the size of a POST body or on the number of messages in a JSON-RPC batch. Large requests could exhaust the server's memory, and one long batch could block it from serving anyone else. No credentials were needed, unless your application authenticates requests before they reach the SDK. ### Am I affected? Yes, if clients you do not fully trust can reach your server over Streamable HTTP. A body parser such as `express.json()` does not protect you, because it does not limit batch length. Servers that only use stdio are not affected. Affected versions: - `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.10.0 through 1.30.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.0 ### Fix Upgrade to: - 1.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.30.1 or later - 2.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.1.0, `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.1.0 and `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.1 or later. Upgrade every one you have installed. Bodies over 4 MiB now get `413`, and batches over 100 messages get `400`. If your clients send larger bodies, raise the new `maxRequestBodySize` option. I
@modelcontextprotocol/node
source listedSEMVER: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.1.0
### Summary In affected versions, MCP servers reachable over HTTP put no limit on the size of a POST body or on the number of messages in a JSON-RPC batch. Large requests could exhaust the server's memory, and one long batch could block it from serving anyone else. No credentials were needed, unless your application authenticates requests before they reach the SDK. ### Am I affected? Yes, if clients you do not fully trust can reach your server over Streamable HTTP. A body parser such as `express.json()` does not protect you, because it does not limit batch length. Servers that only use stdio are not affected. Affected versions: - `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.10.0 through 1.30.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.0 ### Fix Upgrade to: - 1.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.30.1 or later - 2.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.1.0, `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.1.0 and `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.1 or later. Upgrade every one you have installed. Bodies over 4 MiB now get `413`, and batches over 100 messages get `400`. If your clients send larger bodies, raise the new `maxRequestBodySize` option. I
@modelcontextprotocol/hono
source listedSEMVER: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.0.1
### Summary In affected versions, MCP servers reachable over HTTP put no limit on the size of a POST body or on the number of messages in a JSON-RPC batch. Large requests could exhaust the server's memory, and one long batch could block it from serving anyone else. No credentials were needed, unless your application authenticates requests before they reach the SDK. ### Am I affected? Yes, if clients you do not fully trust can reach your server over Streamable HTTP. A body parser such as `express.json()` does not protect you, because it does not limit batch length. Servers that only use stdio are not affected. Affected versions: - `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.10.0 through 1.30.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.0.0 - `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.0 ### Fix Upgrade to: - 1.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.30.1 or later - 2.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.1.0, `@modelcontextprotocol/node` 2.1.0 and `@modelcontextprotocol/hono` 2.0.1 or later. Upgrade every one you have installed. Bodies over 4 MiB now get `413`, and batches over 100 messages get `400`. If your clients send larger bodies, raise the new `maxRequestBodySize` option. I
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.30.1 for @modelcontextprotocol/sdk. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.0 for @modelcontextprotocol/server. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.0 for @modelcontextprotocol/node. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.1 for @modelcontextprotocol/hono. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-f897-62hf-6gxq ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-f897-62hf-6gxq ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.