By Null Ventures MCP platform
Menu

vulnerability / NVI-00008930 / Revision 4

MariaDB Connector/J: Rogue server can drive large heap allocations from server-declared lengths in OK packets

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client, org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client, org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-h599-m3w5-9m7xCVE-2026-119276

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

5.9 medium

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

EPSS

0.351%

FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.28799. Missing scores are unknown.

As of · FIRST EPSS

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client

source listed
  • >= 3.0.0, < 3.3.7

## Summary MariaDB Connector/J sized heap allocations from lengths declared by the server in OK packets before checking that those lengths fit in the packet. A rogue or MitM server can make the client allocate megabytes from a packet of a few bytes. ## Details When `CLIENT_SESSION_TRACK` is negotiated (the default), an OK packet carries an info field followed by session-state blocks, each tracked variable being sent as a length-encoded name and value. `OkPacket.parse()` and `parseWithInfo()` allocated `new byte[len]` for the info field, the variable name and the value with the server-declared `len`, then copied the packet data into it. The copy failed with an `ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException` when the packet was shorter, but only after the allocation had taken place. A server-declared length of 8 MiB in an 18-byte packet was enough to trigger an 8 MiB allocation; the integer-range validation of length-encoded values does not help, since such lengths are valid positive integers. The fix validates every server-declared length against the remaining packet bytes before any allocation (`ReadableByteBuf.checkLength()` and a bounded `readBytes(int)`), and stops reading the session sta

GitHub Advisory Database

org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client

source listed
  • >= 3.4.0, < 3.4.5

## Summary MariaDB Connector/J sized heap allocations from lengths declared by the server in OK packets before checking that those lengths fit in the packet. A rogue or MitM server can make the client allocate megabytes from a packet of a few bytes. ## Details When `CLIENT_SESSION_TRACK` is negotiated (the default), an OK packet carries an info field followed by session-state blocks, each tracked variable being sent as a length-encoded name and value. `OkPacket.parse()` and `parseWithInfo()` allocated `new byte[len]` for the info field, the variable name and the value with the server-declared `len`, then copied the packet data into it. The copy failed with an `ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException` when the packet was shorter, but only after the allocation had taken place. A server-declared length of 8 MiB in an 18-byte packet was enough to trigger an 8 MiB allocation; the integer-range validation of length-encoded values does not help, since such lengths are valid positive integers. The fix validates every server-declared length against the remaining packet bytes before any allocation (`ReadableByteBuf.checkLength()` and a bounded `readBytes(int)`), and stops reading the session sta

GitHub Advisory Database

org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client

source listed
  • >= 3.5.0, < 3.5.11

## Summary MariaDB Connector/J sized heap allocations from lengths declared by the server in OK packets before checking that those lengths fit in the packet. A rogue or MitM server can make the client allocate megabytes from a packet of a few bytes. ## Details When `CLIENT_SESSION_TRACK` is negotiated (the default), an OK packet carries an info field followed by session-state blocks, each tracked variable being sent as a length-encoded name and value. `OkPacket.parse()` and `parseWithInfo()` allocated `new byte[len]` for the info field, the variable name and the value with the server-declared `len`, then copied the packet data into it. The copy failed with an `ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException` when the packet was shorter, but only after the allocation had taken place. A server-declared length of 8 MiB in an 18-byte packet was enough to trigger an 8 MiB allocation; the integer-range validation of length-encoded values does not help, since such lengths are valid positive integers. The fix validates every server-declared length against the remaining packet bytes before any allocation (`ReadableByteBuf.checkLength()` and a bounded `readBytes(int)`), and stops reading the session sta

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-h599-m3w5-9m7x ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. CVE-2026-119276 ↗

    FIRST EPSS · official catalog

    Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 4 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  2. Revision 3 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  3. Revision 2 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗