vulnerability / NVI-00008981 / Revision 2
@eeacms/volto-chatbot has Unauthenticated Danswer API Confused Deputy Proxy
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @eeacms/volto-chatbot. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.2 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@eeacms/volto-chatbot
source listed<= 2.0.3
## Unauthenticated Danswer API Confused Deputy Proxy in @eeacms/volto-chatbot ### Summary `@eeacms/volto-chatbot` exposes an Express middleware route (`**/_v1_da/**`) that accepts unauthenticated HTTP requests from any network client and proxies them to the configured upstream Danswer API, automatically attaching the server-side service credentials (`DANSWER_API_KEY` or session cookie). Because no authorization check, path allowlist, or method restriction is applied before the upstream request is issued, an unauthenticated attacker can invoke arbitrary Danswer API operations — including privileged admin endpoints — as the configured service account. This is a classic Confused Deputy attack: the Volto proxy acts as a deputy that carries credentials on behalf of the attacker. ### Details The vulnerability is introduced across two source files in `@eeacms/volto-chatbot@2.0.3`. **Route registration (`src/index.js:15`):** ```js middleware.all('**/_v1_da/**', proxyMiddleware); ``` The wildcard pattern matches every HTTP method and any sub-path, and no authentication middleware is chained before `proxyMiddleware`. This means all requests reaching any `/_v1_da/` path are forwarded w
@eeacms/volto-chatbot
source listedSEMVER: introduced 0; fixed 2.0.4
## Unauthenticated Danswer API Confused Deputy Proxy in @eeacms/volto-chatbot ### Summary `@eeacms/volto-chatbot` exposes an Express middleware route (`**/_v1_da/**`) that accepts unauthenticated HTTP requests from any network client and proxies them to the configured upstream Danswer API, automatically attaching the server-side service credentials (`DANSWER_API_KEY` or session cookie). Because no authorization check, path allowlist, or method restriction is applied before the upstream request is issued, an unauthenticated attacker can invoke arbitrary Danswer API operations — including privileged admin endpoints — as the configured service account. This is a classic Confused Deputy attack: the Volto proxy acts as a deputy that carries credentials on behalf of the attacker. ### Details The vulnerability is introduced across two source files in `@eeacms/volto-chatbot@2.0.3`. **Route registration (`src/index.js:15`):** ```js middleware.all('**/_v1_da/**', proxyMiddleware); ``` The wildcard pattern matches every HTTP method and any sub-path, and no authentication middleware is chained before `proxyMiddleware`. This means all requests reaching any `/_v1_da/` path are forwarded w
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.4 for @eeacms/volto-chatbot. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-w9x9-j56r-h98r ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-w9x9-j56r-h98r ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.