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vulnerability / NVI-00009060 / Revision 4

undici WebSocket client vulnerable to Denial of Service via unbounded automatic PONG buffering

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for undici, undici, undici. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-9fm3-97px-rjf6CVE-2026-109932

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

5.9 medium

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

EPSS

0.321%

FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.2522. Missing scores are unknown.

As of · FIRST EPSS

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

undici

source listed
  • >= 5.15.0, < 6.29.1

### Impact undici's WebSocket client (including Node.js's bundled `globalThis.WebSocket`) can be driven to exhaust process memory by a malicious or compromised WebSocket server. For every PING frame received, the receiver automatically writes a PONG response to the socket and ignores the `false` return value from `socket.write()`, which is a backpressure signal, so a server that streams small PING frames while never reading the client's PONGs makes the outbound write queue and heap grow without bound until the Node.js process runs out of memory and terminates. The attack is remote and unauthenticated, needs only a normal WebSocket connection, and is asymmetric: small inbound PINGs produce a much larger retained outbound queue. Availability is the only impact. undici 5.x, 6.x, 7.x, and 8.x are affected; the WebSocket client was introduced in 5.15.0. ### Patches Upgrade to `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`, which pause WebSocket frame parsing when the automatic PONG response hits socket backpressure and resume on drain, bounding the outbound queue. ### Workarounds None.

GitHub Advisory Database

undici

source listed
  • >= 7.0.0, < 7.30.1

### Impact undici's WebSocket client (including Node.js's bundled `globalThis.WebSocket`) can be driven to exhaust process memory by a malicious or compromised WebSocket server. For every PING frame received, the receiver automatically writes a PONG response to the socket and ignores the `false` return value from `socket.write()`, which is a backpressure signal, so a server that streams small PING frames while never reading the client's PONGs makes the outbound write queue and heap grow without bound until the Node.js process runs out of memory and terminates. The attack is remote and unauthenticated, needs only a normal WebSocket connection, and is asymmetric: small inbound PINGs produce a much larger retained outbound queue. Availability is the only impact. undici 5.x, 6.x, 7.x, and 8.x are affected; the WebSocket client was introduced in 5.15.0. ### Patches Upgrade to `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`, which pause WebSocket frame parsing when the automatic PONG response hits socket backpressure and resume on drain, bounding the outbound queue. ### Workarounds None.

GitHub Advisory Database

undici

source listed
  • >= 8.0.0, < 8.12.2

### Impact undici's WebSocket client (including Node.js's bundled `globalThis.WebSocket`) can be driven to exhaust process memory by a malicious or compromised WebSocket server. For every PING frame received, the receiver automatically writes a PONG response to the socket and ignores the `false` return value from `socket.write()`, which is a backpressure signal, so a server that streams small PING frames while never reading the client's PONGs makes the outbound write queue and heap grow without bound until the Node.js process runs out of memory and terminates. The attack is remote and unauthenticated, needs only a normal WebSocket connection, and is asymmetric: small inbound PINGs produce a much larger retained outbound queue. Availability is the only impact. undici 5.x, 6.x, 7.x, and 8.x are affected; the WebSocket client was introduced in 5.15.0. ### Patches Upgrade to `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`, which pause WebSocket frame parsing when the automatic PONG response hits socket backpressure and resume on drain, bounding the outbound queue. ### Workarounds None.

GitHub Advisory Database

undici

source listed
  • SEMVER: introduced 5.15.0; fixed 6.29.1

### Impact undici's WebSocket client (including Node.js's bundled `globalThis.WebSocket`) can be driven to exhaust process memory by a malicious or compromised WebSocket server. For every PING frame received, the receiver automatically writes a PONG response to the socket and ignores the `false` return value from `socket.write()`, which is a backpressure signal, so a server that streams small PING frames while never reading the client's PONGs makes the outbound write queue and heap grow without bound until the Node.js process runs out of memory and terminates. The attack is remote and unauthenticated, needs only a normal WebSocket connection, and is asymmetric: small inbound PINGs produce a much larger retained outbound queue. Availability is the only impact. undici 5.x, 6.x, 7.x, and 8.x are affected; the WebSocket client was introduced in 5.15.0. ### Patches Upgrade to `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`, which pause WebSocket frame parsing when the automatic PONG response hits socket backpressure and resume on drain, bounding the outbound queue. ### Workarounds None.

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

undici

source listed
  • SEMVER: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.30.1

### Impact undici's WebSocket client (including Node.js's bundled `globalThis.WebSocket`) can be driven to exhaust process memory by a malicious or compromised WebSocket server. For every PING frame received, the receiver automatically writes a PONG response to the socket and ignores the `false` return value from `socket.write()`, which is a backpressure signal, so a server that streams small PING frames while never reading the client's PONGs makes the outbound write queue and heap grow without bound until the Node.js process runs out of memory and terminates. The attack is remote and unauthenticated, needs only a normal WebSocket connection, and is asymmetric: small inbound PINGs produce a much larger retained outbound queue. Availability is the only impact. undici 5.x, 6.x, 7.x, and 8.x are affected; the WebSocket client was introduced in 5.15.0. ### Patches Upgrade to `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`, which pause WebSocket frame parsing when the automatic PONG response hits socket backpressure and resume on drain, bounding the outbound queue. ### Workarounds None.

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

undici

source listed
  • SEMVER: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.12.2

### Impact undici's WebSocket client (including Node.js's bundled `globalThis.WebSocket`) can be driven to exhaust process memory by a malicious or compromised WebSocket server. For every PING frame received, the receiver automatically writes a PONG response to the socket and ignores the `false` return value from `socket.write()`, which is a backpressure signal, so a server that streams small PING frames while never reading the client's PONGs makes the outbound write queue and heap grow without bound until the Node.js process runs out of memory and terminates. The attack is remote and unauthenticated, needs only a normal WebSocket connection, and is asymmetric: small inbound PINGs produce a much larger retained outbound queue. Availability is the only impact. undici 5.x, 6.x, 7.x, and 8.x are affected; the WebSocket client was introduced in 5.15.0. ### Patches Upgrade to `6.29.1`, `7.30.1`, or `8.12.2`, which pause WebSocket frame parsing when the automatic PONG response hits socket backpressure and resume on drain, bounding the outbound queue. ### Workarounds None.

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS

  2. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.29.1 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  3. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.30.1 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  4. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.12.2 for undici. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-9fm3-97px-rjf6 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. GHSA-9fm3-97px-rjf6 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.

  3. CVE-2026-109932 ↗

    FIRST EPSS · official catalog

    Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 4 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  2. Revision 3 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  3. Revision 2 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  4. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗