vulnerability / NVI-00009089 / Revision 5
Forge: Regular expression denial of service in PEM decoding (pem.decode)
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for node-forge. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.556%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.46534. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
node-forge
source listed<= 1.4.0
### Summary `pem.decode()`, which every node-forge API that parses PEM input uses, split messages with a regular expression that takes polynomial time on input without a matching END line, and parsed encapsulated headers with regular expressions that take quadratic time on long header lines. A remote attacker can block the Node.js event loop for seconds to minutes with a crafted input of a few tens of kilobytes. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. ### Details `pem.decode()` in `lib/pem.js` found PEM messages with this regular expression: /\s*-----BEGIN ([A-Z0-9- ]+)-----\r?\n?([\x21-\x7e\s]+?(?:\r?\n\r?\n))?([:A-Za-z0-9+\/=\s]+?)-----END \1-----/g The optional headers group and the body group are adjacent, lazy, and share characters (whitespace and the base64 alphabet), and the match must end with an END line whose label equals the BEGIN label (`\1`). When no such END line follows, the engine tries every split of the text between the two groups, for every label split and at every BEGIN line in the input. The work grows polynomially with the input length (roughly cubic for repeated BEGIN/END lines with mismatched labels, quadratic for a BEGIN line followed by many newlines). The enca
node-forge
source listedSEMVER: introduced 0; fixed 1.4.1
### Summary `pem.decode()`, which every node-forge API that parses PEM input uses, split messages with a regular expression that takes polynomial time on input without a matching END line, and parsed encapsulated headers with regular expressions that take quadratic time on long header lines. A remote attacker can block the Node.js event loop for seconds to minutes with a crafted input of a few tens of kilobytes. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. ### Details `pem.decode()` in `lib/pem.js` found PEM messages with this regular expression: /\s*-----BEGIN ([A-Z0-9- ]+)-----\r?\n?([\x21-\x7e\s]+?(?:\r?\n\r?\n))?([:A-Za-z0-9+\/=\s]+?)-----END \1-----/g The optional headers group and the body group are adjacent, lazy, and share characters (whitespace and the base64 alphabet), and the match must end with an END line whose label equals the BEGIN label (`\1`). When no such END line follows, the engine tries every split of the text between the two groups, for every label split and at every BEGIN line in the input. The work grows polynomially with the input length (roughly cubic for repeated BEGIN/END lines with mismatched labels, quadratic for a BEGIN line followed by many newlines). The enca
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.4.1 for node-forge. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-7wch-p9px-956x ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-7wch-p9px-956x ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-118779 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 5 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 4 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.