vulnerability / NVI-00009093 / Revision 1
Vikunja: Explicit lower-permission share on a sub-project is silently overridden by an inherited parent permission (broken access control / privilege-management regression in v2.6.0)
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for code.vikunja.io/api. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
5.4 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
code.vikunja.io/api
source listed= 2.6.0
## Description ### Summary In Vikunja v2.6.0 the project-permission engine resolves a user's effective permission on a project as the **MAX over the entire reachable project subtree**. As a result, when a user has been granted a **higher** permission on a parent project and the owner *explicitly* shares a **child** project with that same user at a **lower** permission (an intended down-restriction), the explicit lower grant is **silently ignored** and the user receives the higher, inherited permission on the child. A user who was deliberately restricted to **read-only** on a sensitive sub-project can therefore modify it, delete it, and re-share it (including granting other users admin) - none of which the owner intended. This is a behavior regression from v2.5.0, whose engine used "nearest-ancestor-grant-wins" semantics that honored the explicit child grant. ### Details Effective permissions are computed by a single recursive CTE in `pkg/models/project_access.go` (`getProjectAccessForUser`): ```sql WITH RECURSIVE grants (project_id, permission) AS ( SELECT project_id, MAX(permission) FROM ( SELECT id AS project_id, 2 AS permission FROM projects WHERE owner_id = ?
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
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Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-pjr3-86v4-5p7w ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.