vulnerability / NVI-00009097 / Revision 2
OpenAM Insecure SSO Cookie Initialization
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-core. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.409%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.35231. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-core
source listed< 16.1.1
## Summary **Description** An Insecure Default Initialization of Resource (CWE-1188) issue in the OpenAM default configuration ships the `iPlanetDirectoryPro` SSO cookie with `HttpOnly=false`. Also, the `iPlanetDirectoryPro` SSO cookie is used as a CSRF token in OAuth/OIDC flows. This affects OpenAM Community Edition through version 16.0.6 and was patched in version 16.1.1. ## Impact A single click on an attacker link may yield full SSO session theft of any authenticated console user when chained with any other same-origin XSS in the OpenAM origin. The missing `SameSite` default also widens the CSRF surface. Also, because the consent flow reuses the SSO cookie as its CSRF token, any XSS in the OpenAM origin both steals the session and completes attacker-driven OAuth consent grants in one step. ## Patch This has been patched in OpenAM Community Edition version 16.1.1. Users are encouraged to update to the latest release.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-fpmh-vx4h-xc33 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-53660 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.