vulnerability / NVI-00009166 / Revision 3
gramps-webapi: Zip Slip Path Traversal in Media Archive Import
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for gramps-webapi. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
9.1 critical
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.401%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.34321. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
gramps-webapi
source listed>= 1.6.0, <= 3.11.0
## Summary A path traversal vulnerability (Zip Slip) exists in the media archive import feature. An authenticated user with owner-level privileges can craft a malicious ZIP file with directory-traversal filenames to write arbitrary files outside the intended temporary extraction directory on the server's local filesystem. ## Details When importing media archives as ZIP file, `MediaImporter._check_disk_space_and_extract()` in `gramps_webapi/api/media_importer.py` called `zipfile.extractall()` without validating ZIP entry names. Python's `zipfile` module does not sanitize entry names containing `../` sequences, allowing extraction to paths outside the target directory. Only users with **owner permission** can upload media ZIP archives, so the biggest risk is for multi-tree deployments, where tree owners are distinct from server administrators. For multi-tree deployments, the impact depends on deployment configuration. Assuming the standard docker-based deployment is used: - **SQLite family tree + local media**: An attacker can overwrite another tree's database file or media files, leading to cross-tree data corruption or replacement. - **Postgres family tree + S3 media**: No pe
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-m5gr-86j6-99jp ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-40258 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.