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supply chain event / NVI-00009588 / Revision 1

Malicious code in sharpnes (crates.io)

GitHub lists this malware advisory for sharpnes. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-qq2r-xp7w-5r55

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

sharpnes

source listed
  • > 0

sharpnes is a malicious crate published to crates.io on 2026-10-09 by the account crows7781-glitch (versions 0.1.0 and 0.1.1), described only as "The sharpnes project is a learn.". It is an infostealer that exfiltrates data to attacker-controlled Telegram bots when the exported async function shortname() is called. src/teleg.rs (commented "telegram stealer") runs on Windows only: it collects Telegram Desktop session data from %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Telegram Desktop\tdata and :\Telegram Desktop\tdata (drives C-J), zips it to tdata_backup.zip and uploads it via the Telegram Bot API sendDocument endpoint using a hardcoded bot token to chat -1003869029825. src/data.rs (commented "chrome stealer") uses XOR (key 0xAA) obfuscated strings and Chinese identifiers to locate the Chrome Default profile "Local Extension Settings" directory (which holds browser extension data such as crypto wallet vaults) on Windows, Linux and macOS, zips it in memory and sends it as 文件.zip via teloxide using a second hardcoded bot token to the same chat. In 0.1.0 the Chrome stealer is present but not called; 0.1.1 wires it into shortname(). --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-qq2r-xp7w-5r55 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

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