supply chain event / NVI-00009616 / Revision 1
Malicious code in nitro-cjs-requirer (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for nitro-cjs-requirer, nitro-cjs-requirer, nitro-cjs-requirer, nitro-cjs-requirer, nitro-cjs-requirer. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
nitro-cjs-requirer
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (b78ca7e6d900dde3d7b9a367cdc359f3ec47a8b662ff53dd9c6542edbdb00b0b) The package is a beacon carrier with no real functionality. The declared postinstall script runs beacon.cjs, which POSTs the package name, os.hostname(), __dirname install path, process.cwd(), and node version to the hardcoded bare-IP, plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The same fire() call is also invoked at module load from index.js, which otherwise exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for every property so the module appears to be a compatibility shim. Installer host identifiers are therefore sent unconditionally both at npm install (via the postinstall lifecycle hook) and on require(), to a bare-IP endpoint unrelated to any publisher, with no caller opt-in and no documented purpose. The shape — hollow stub module, dual install-time and require-time beacon trigger, hardcoded bare-IP over plain HTTP, host/path/cwd identifiers — is a dependency-confusion or build-pipeline reconnaissance probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/ff41f6680a0ebbef2268cdb5daf253d4b400cb05/osv/
nitro-cjs-requirer
source listed= 0.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (b78ca7e6d900dde3d7b9a367cdc359f3ec47a8b662ff53dd9c6542edbdb00b0b) The package is a beacon carrier with no real functionality. The declared postinstall script runs beacon.cjs, which POSTs the package name, os.hostname(), __dirname install path, process.cwd(), and node version to the hardcoded bare-IP, plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The same fire() call is also invoked at module load from index.js, which otherwise exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for every property so the module appears to be a compatibility shim. Installer host identifiers are therefore sent unconditionally both at npm install (via the postinstall lifecycle hook) and on require(), to a bare-IP endpoint unrelated to any publisher, with no caller opt-in and no documented purpose. The shape — hollow stub module, dual install-time and require-time beacon trigger, hardcoded bare-IP over plain HTTP, host/path/cwd identifiers — is a dependency-confusion or build-pipeline reconnaissance probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/ff41f6680a0ebbef2268cdb5daf253d4b400cb05/osv/
nitro-cjs-requirer
source listed= 1.1.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (b78ca7e6d900dde3d7b9a367cdc359f3ec47a8b662ff53dd9c6542edbdb00b0b) The package is a beacon carrier with no real functionality. The declared postinstall script runs beacon.cjs, which POSTs the package name, os.hostname(), __dirname install path, process.cwd(), and node version to the hardcoded bare-IP, plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The same fire() call is also invoked at module load from index.js, which otherwise exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for every property so the module appears to be a compatibility shim. Installer host identifiers are therefore sent unconditionally both at npm install (via the postinstall lifecycle hook) and on require(), to a bare-IP endpoint unrelated to any publisher, with no caller opt-in and no documented purpose. The shape — hollow stub module, dual install-time and require-time beacon trigger, hardcoded bare-IP over plain HTTP, host/path/cwd identifiers — is a dependency-confusion or build-pipeline reconnaissance probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/ff41f6680a0ebbef2268cdb5daf253d4b400cb05/osv/
nitro-cjs-requirer
source listed= 2.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (b78ca7e6d900dde3d7b9a367cdc359f3ec47a8b662ff53dd9c6542edbdb00b0b) The package is a beacon carrier with no real functionality. The declared postinstall script runs beacon.cjs, which POSTs the package name, os.hostname(), __dirname install path, process.cwd(), and node version to the hardcoded bare-IP, plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The same fire() call is also invoked at module load from index.js, which otherwise exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for every property so the module appears to be a compatibility shim. Installer host identifiers are therefore sent unconditionally both at npm install (via the postinstall lifecycle hook) and on require(), to a bare-IP endpoint unrelated to any publisher, with no caller opt-in and no documented purpose. The shape — hollow stub module, dual install-time and require-time beacon trigger, hardcoded bare-IP over plain HTTP, host/path/cwd identifiers — is a dependency-confusion or build-pipeline reconnaissance probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/ff41f6680a0ebbef2268cdb5daf253d4b400cb05/osv/
nitro-cjs-requirer
source listed= 99.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (b78ca7e6d900dde3d7b9a367cdc359f3ec47a8b662ff53dd9c6542edbdb00b0b) The package is a beacon carrier with no real functionality. The declared postinstall script runs beacon.cjs, which POSTs the package name, os.hostname(), __dirname install path, process.cwd(), and node version to the hardcoded bare-IP, plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The same fire() call is also invoked at module load from index.js, which otherwise exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for every property so the module appears to be a compatibility shim. Installer host identifiers are therefore sent unconditionally both at npm install (via the postinstall lifecycle hook) and on require(), to a bare-IP endpoint unrelated to any publisher, with no caller opt-in and no documented purpose. The shape — hollow stub module, dual install-time and require-time beacon trigger, hardcoded bare-IP over plain HTTP, host/path/cwd identifiers — is a dependency-confusion or build-pipeline reconnaissance probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/ff41f6680a0ebbef2268cdb5daf253d4b400cb05/osv/
nitro-cjs-requirer
source listed= 3.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (b78ca7e6d900dde3d7b9a367cdc359f3ec47a8b662ff53dd9c6542edbdb00b0b) The package is a beacon carrier with no real functionality. The declared postinstall script runs beacon.cjs, which POSTs the package name, os.hostname(), __dirname install path, process.cwd(), and node version to the hardcoded bare-IP, plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The same fire() call is also invoked at module load from index.js, which otherwise exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for every property so the module appears to be a compatibility shim. Installer host identifiers are therefore sent unconditionally both at npm install (via the postinstall lifecycle hook) and on require(), to a bare-IP endpoint unrelated to any publisher, with no caller opt-in and no documented purpose. The shape — hollow stub module, dual install-time and require-time beacon trigger, hardcoded bare-IP over plain HTTP, host/path/cwd identifiers — is a dependency-confusion or build-pipeline reconnaissance probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/ff41f6680a0ebbef2268cdb5daf253d4b400cb05/osv/
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-hp5p-fc9h-wfg5 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.