supply chain event / NVI-00009626 / Revision 1
Malicious code in nested-lib (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for nested-lib, nested-lib, nested-lib. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
nested-lib
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (0a0b849de5330a4a4984a855f83ce1638b17e459d359312319ff35dc0e02f928) The package declares `scripts.postinstall = "node beacon.cjs"` and `index.js` also invokes `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` at module load. `beacon.cjs` POSTs a JSON payload containing `os.hostname()`, `__dirname`, `process.cwd()`, and `process.version` over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The destination is not a documented first-party service and the host identifiers are sent without any opt-in. `index.js` otherwise exports a Proxy that returns no-op functions for every property access, so the package provides no real functionality — its sole on-install and on-require effect is the beacon. The combination of a hollow Proxy shim, a bare-IP plain-HTTP destination, and automatic firing from both the npm lifecycle hook and the main module is consistent with a reconnaissance/confirmation beacon used to validate successful installation into target environments, typically preceding a second-stage payload. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/ff41f6680a0ebb
nested-lib
source listed= 1.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (0a0b849de5330a4a4984a855f83ce1638b17e459d359312319ff35dc0e02f928) The package declares `scripts.postinstall = "node beacon.cjs"` and `index.js` also invokes `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` at module load. `beacon.cjs` POSTs a JSON payload containing `os.hostname()`, `__dirname`, `process.cwd()`, and `process.version` over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The destination is not a documented first-party service and the host identifiers are sent without any opt-in. `index.js` otherwise exports a Proxy that returns no-op functions for every property access, so the package provides no real functionality — its sole on-install and on-require effect is the beacon. The combination of a hollow Proxy shim, a bare-IP plain-HTTP destination, and automatic firing from both the npm lifecycle hook and the main module is consistent with a reconnaissance/confirmation beacon used to validate successful installation into target environments, typically preceding a second-stage payload. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/ff41f6680a0ebb
nested-lib
source listed= 1.1.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (0a0b849de5330a4a4984a855f83ce1638b17e459d359312319ff35dc0e02f928) The package declares `scripts.postinstall = "node beacon.cjs"` and `index.js` also invokes `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` at module load. `beacon.cjs` POSTs a JSON payload containing `os.hostname()`, `__dirname`, `process.cwd()`, and `process.version` over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The destination is not a documented first-party service and the host identifiers are sent without any opt-in. `index.js` otherwise exports a Proxy that returns no-op functions for every property access, so the package provides no real functionality — its sole on-install and on-require effect is the beacon. The combination of a hollow Proxy shim, a bare-IP plain-HTTP destination, and automatic firing from both the npm lifecycle hook and the main module is consistent with a reconnaissance/confirmation beacon used to validate successful installation into target environments, typically preceding a second-stage payload. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/ff41f6680a0ebb
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-vhwg-xx2q-m28q ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.