supply chain event / NVI-00009631 / Revision 1
Malicious code in @dransay/phone-fix-test (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for @dransay/phone-fix-test. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@dransay/phone-fix-test
source listed= 99.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (e01479e9a6af5de5f6abec6c16007bd3757b52b0e434b38b44d40fde12961c08) Package.json declares scripts.preinstall="node beacon.js", which fires automatically on npm install. beacon.js performs a DNS lookup and HTTPS GET to a hardcoded Interactsh/OAST subdomain under oast.site, keyed on the package name, causing the installing host's source IP and resolver metadata to be logged by a non-first-party collector. The package is published under the @dransay scope on the public npm registry at version 99.0.0 — the standard dependency-confusion probe shape (scoped name matching a target organization, implausibly high version to win resolution against an internal package of the same name). Any build system that resolves @dransay/phone-fix-test from public npm will execute the preinstall callout and leak its network identifier to the researcher's OAST endpoint. The README self-labels the behavior as authorized security research, but a self-label does not change the installer-side effect: unconsented install-time exfiltration of host-identifying network metadata to a researcher-controlled collector. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([so
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-4jfw-qx8x-7gv2 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.