supply chain event / NVI-00009634 / Revision 1
Malicious code in web3-signer-kit (RubyGems)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for web3-signer-kit. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
web3-signer-kit
source listed= 0.9.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (fe57c8011ef7048ef33ccdb828615b8efd9ab10799a2a730d12c2d854c2e0895) The gem's extconf.rb decodes a base64 literal and eval's it at `gem install` time inside a double-forked, session-detached child whose stdio is redirected to /dev/null. The decoded payload opens a TCPSocket to 45.138.12.177:8089 and bridges a `/bin/sh` process over that socket via IO.popen + IO.copy_stream, yielding full-host remote code execution for the operator of that endpoint. Execution is gated by sandbox-evasion checks that skip CI, ephemeral/short-uptime hosts, analyst-style usernames, and analysis paths, and requires developer artifacts (~/.ssh, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.gem/credentials) to be present before firing; a randomized sleep of 1200+rand(1200) seconds further delays detonation. The package has no legitimate functionality: metadata describes it as a 'web3 signer kit' while the README advertises `bitcoin-rpc-lite`, the library exposes only stub methods (`build_id`, `healthy?`), and extconf.rb calls `create_makefile('bitcoin_rpc_lite_native')` with no C sources shipped. The entire gem is a decoy wrapper around the dropper in extconf.rb. --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/os
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-m6qx-67h3-wwrh ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.