supply chain event / NVI-00009638 / Revision 1
Malicious code in wie888r (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for wie888r, wie888r, wie888r, wie888r, wie888r. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
wie888r
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (b3f438329492b2e0f2917a0eebe97ad8149149b66cd5eb9201bed0b8f5750e7b) wie888r@3.0.0 ships a stub main (index.js) that exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for any property access, so bundlers that resolve this name do not crash. The package's postinstall script runs beacon.cjs, which collects host identifiers (hostname, install path, cwd, node version) and POSTs them to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc over plain HTTP. index.js invokes the same beacon on require, so the exfiltration fires both at install time and whenever the module is loaded. The destination is not a documented first-party service, and the package's self-described 'compatibility shim' purpose is contradicted by the beacon behavior. The combination of a no-op Proxy stub, a hardcoded non-publisher bare-IP endpoint, and dual install-time plus import-time reconnaissance is the standard shape of a dependency-confusion / typosquat probe used to confirm resolution of an unexpected name inside a target environment. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/198de23effaed79e1ee13
wie888r
source listed= 99.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (b3f438329492b2e0f2917a0eebe97ad8149149b66cd5eb9201bed0b8f5750e7b) wie888r@3.0.0 ships a stub main (index.js) that exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for any property access, so bundlers that resolve this name do not crash. The package's postinstall script runs beacon.cjs, which collects host identifiers (hostname, install path, cwd, node version) and POSTs them to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc over plain HTTP. index.js invokes the same beacon on require, so the exfiltration fires both at install time and whenever the module is loaded. The destination is not a documented first-party service, and the package's self-described 'compatibility shim' purpose is contradicted by the beacon behavior. The combination of a no-op Proxy stub, a hardcoded non-publisher bare-IP endpoint, and dual install-time plus import-time reconnaissance is the standard shape of a dependency-confusion / typosquat probe used to confirm resolution of an unexpected name inside a target environment. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/198de23effaed79e1ee13
wie888r
source listed= 1.1.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (b3f438329492b2e0f2917a0eebe97ad8149149b66cd5eb9201bed0b8f5750e7b) wie888r@3.0.0 ships a stub main (index.js) that exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for any property access, so bundlers that resolve this name do not crash. The package's postinstall script runs beacon.cjs, which collects host identifiers (hostname, install path, cwd, node version) and POSTs them to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc over plain HTTP. index.js invokes the same beacon on require, so the exfiltration fires both at install time and whenever the module is loaded. The destination is not a documented first-party service, and the package's self-described 'compatibility shim' purpose is contradicted by the beacon behavior. The combination of a no-op Proxy stub, a hardcoded non-publisher bare-IP endpoint, and dual install-time plus import-time reconnaissance is the standard shape of a dependency-confusion / typosquat probe used to confirm resolution of an unexpected name inside a target environment. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/198de23effaed79e1ee13
wie888r
source listed= 0.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (b3f438329492b2e0f2917a0eebe97ad8149149b66cd5eb9201bed0b8f5750e7b) wie888r@3.0.0 ships a stub main (index.js) that exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for any property access, so bundlers that resolve this name do not crash. The package's postinstall script runs beacon.cjs, which collects host identifiers (hostname, install path, cwd, node version) and POSTs them to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc over plain HTTP. index.js invokes the same beacon on require, so the exfiltration fires both at install time and whenever the module is loaded. The destination is not a documented first-party service, and the package's self-described 'compatibility shim' purpose is contradicted by the beacon behavior. The combination of a no-op Proxy stub, a hardcoded non-publisher bare-IP endpoint, and dual install-time plus import-time reconnaissance is the standard shape of a dependency-confusion / typosquat probe used to confirm resolution of an unexpected name inside a target environment. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/198de23effaed79e1ee13
wie888r
source listed= 2.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (b3f438329492b2e0f2917a0eebe97ad8149149b66cd5eb9201bed0b8f5750e7b) wie888r@3.0.0 ships a stub main (index.js) that exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for any property access, so bundlers that resolve this name do not crash. The package's postinstall script runs beacon.cjs, which collects host identifiers (hostname, install path, cwd, node version) and POSTs them to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc over plain HTTP. index.js invokes the same beacon on require, so the exfiltration fires both at install time and whenever the module is loaded. The destination is not a documented first-party service, and the package's self-described 'compatibility shim' purpose is contradicted by the beacon behavior. The combination of a no-op Proxy stub, a hardcoded non-publisher bare-IP endpoint, and dual install-time plus import-time reconnaissance is the standard shape of a dependency-confusion / typosquat probe used to confirm resolution of an unexpected name inside a target environment. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/198de23effaed79e1ee13
wie888r
source listed= 3.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (b3f438329492b2e0f2917a0eebe97ad8149149b66cd5eb9201bed0b8f5750e7b) wie888r@3.0.0 ships a stub main (index.js) that exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for any property access, so bundlers that resolve this name do not crash. The package's postinstall script runs beacon.cjs, which collects host identifiers (hostname, install path, cwd, node version) and POSTs them to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc over plain HTTP. index.js invokes the same beacon on require, so the exfiltration fires both at install time and whenever the module is loaded. The destination is not a documented first-party service, and the package's self-described 'compatibility shim' purpose is contradicted by the beacon behavior. The combination of a no-op Proxy stub, a hardcoded non-publisher bare-IP endpoint, and dual install-time plus import-time reconnaissance is the standard shape of a dependency-confusion / typosquat probe used to confirm resolution of an unexpected name inside a target environment. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/198de23effaed79e1ee13
wie888r
source listed= 2.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (b3f438329492b2e0f2917a0eebe97ad8149149b66cd5eb9201bed0b8f5750e7b) wie888r@3.0.0 ships a stub main (index.js) that exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for any property access, so bundlers that resolve this name do not crash. The package's postinstall script runs beacon.cjs, which collects host identifiers (hostname, install path, cwd, node version) and POSTs them to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc over plain HTTP. index.js invokes the same beacon on require, so the exfiltration fires both at install time and whenever the module is loaded. The destination is not a documented first-party service, and the package's self-described 'compatibility shim' purpose is contradicted by the beacon behavior. The combination of a no-op Proxy stub, a hardcoded non-publisher bare-IP endpoint, and dual install-time plus import-time reconnaissance is the standard shape of a dependency-confusion / typosquat probe used to confirm resolution of an unexpected name inside a target environment. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/198de23effaed79e1ee13
wie888r
source listed= 1.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (b3f438329492b2e0f2917a0eebe97ad8149149b66cd5eb9201bed0b8f5750e7b) wie888r@3.0.0 ships a stub main (index.js) that exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for any property access, so bundlers that resolve this name do not crash. The package's postinstall script runs beacon.cjs, which collects host identifiers (hostname, install path, cwd, node version) and POSTs them to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc over plain HTTP. index.js invokes the same beacon on require, so the exfiltration fires both at install time and whenever the module is loaded. The destination is not a documented first-party service, and the package's self-described 'compatibility shim' purpose is contradicted by the beacon behavior. The combination of a no-op Proxy stub, a hardcoded non-publisher bare-IP endpoint, and dual install-time plus import-time reconnaissance is the standard shape of a dependency-confusion / typosquat probe used to confirm resolution of an unexpected name inside a target environment. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/198de23effaed79e1ee13
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-fhmp-x3hx-6669 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.