supply chain event / NVI-00009663 / Revision 1
Malicious code in hardhat-deep (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for hardhat-deep. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
hardhat-deep
source listed= 2.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (fde0a4a0ec197ee1aab9acf20ea157268b553fdb5669c545c27d92cbf89fe304) The npm package hardhat-deep@2.0.1 is a trojanised shell. Its tarball copies the pino logger source tree (README, SECURITY.md, index.d.ts, lib/proto.js, lib/transport.js, lib/worker.js, lib/levels.js, lib/multistream.js, etc.) verbatim, while the package name and manifest description target the Hardhat ecosystem. The only novel file is lib/config.js, a single-line 4,499,968-byte obfuscator.io bundle with a 26,234-entry rotated string array, two decoder functions, hex-encoded strings and control-flow flattening. The package's top-level index.js is modified from pino's original to unconditionally `require('./lib/config')`, so any consumer that `require`s or `import`s hardhat-deep executes this opaque payload inside the installer's Node process. The exported middleware is a no-op cover with no logger functionality, so running the obfuscated blob is the only effect of installing or loading the package. The author identity (Robert King , jsonspack.com) is unrelated to either Hardhat or pinojs. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](ht
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-2gp8-v9xv-8rqv ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.