supply chain event / NVI-00009677 / Revision 1
Malicious code in hardhat-bits (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for hardhat-bits. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
hardhat-bits
source listed= 2.21.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (4e10f22980d33eea7649312f6b2b0a94637e5b4da400f7d585c58b6902a77944) The package is published as hardhat-bits but its README, LICENSE, docs/, and lib/* files are copied verbatim from the pino logger project, providing cover for an inserted file at lib/config.js. index.js performs `const config = require('./lib/config')` at the top level, so the file executes unconditionally when the module is required. lib/config.js is a single-line, ~4.47 MB obfuscator.io output: a 26,130-entry shuffled string array with a rotating decoder, hex-escaped member access, RC4-style key-schedule string decoding, control-flow flattening, and a self-defending IIFE. The exported `middleware` in index.js is a no-op `(_req, _res, next) => next()`, so the obfuscated module serves no documented purpose in the public API. The combination of name/branding mismatch (hardhat tooling name, pino content), a stub public API, and a multi-megabyte obfuscated blob auto-executed on import matches the trojan-loader shape used by npm supply-chain malware; any installer that requires hardhat-bits runs attacker-controlled code hidden behind the obfuscation. --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-v53q-jg59-2hf6 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.