supply chain event / NVI-00009722 / Revision 1
Malicious code in hardhat-promised (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for hardhat-promised. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
hardhat-promised
source listed= 2.21.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (306eed59a2a4d15563101a3bfde19c1d6d5e0c9152cb0f3d0f421331e075ef4e) The npm package hardhat-promised impersonates the pino logger: it ships pino's README (with pino shields.io badges linking to npmjs.com/package/pino), LICENSE, docs/, index.d.ts, and lib/ directory layout verbatim, while publishing under an unrelated name. index.js is a thin cover-story stub mirroring pino's public API and, at module top level, executes `require('./lib/config')`. lib/config.js is a 4,373,384-byte obfuscator.io-packed script (26,185-entry rotating string array, ~134k deobfuscation transforms, hex-escaped bootstrapper of the form `(function(a,z){const kb={...}})`) with no relation to the small constants module it replaces in real pino. Any consumer that requires this package executes the opaque 4.3MB blob on the installer's host at library load. The combination of unrelated-package impersonation, injected multi-megabyte obfuscated code where a trivial config module is advertised, and top-level execution on import is the trojanized-logger shape used to smuggle installer-harm code into dependency trees. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([sou
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-hr4j-2x3w-xj3x ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.