supply chain event / NVI-00009735 / Revision 1
Malicious code in another-very-long-name (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for another-very-long-name, another-very-long-name, another-very-long-name, another-very-long-name. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
another-very-long-name
source listed= 2.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (eea9e3cf3d973c07d09048435d4ddc496574ce222d650c228b1400d866ea3ccf) another-very-long-name@1.0.1 ships a beacon.cjs that is invoked both from the declared postinstall lifecycle script and from the module's require()-time entry (index.js). On execution it collects host identifiers — hostname, install path, process.cwd(), process.version, OS metadata, and the package name — and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded cleartext endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The package exposes no genuine functionality: index.js returns a Proxy whose get handler returns a no-op for every property so that bundlers consuming the package do not fail, and an author comment states that a build that completes and calls back is cleaner evidence. The destination is a bare-IP HTTP endpoint with no first-party relationship to any declared publisher, and the stub-plus-beacon shape is consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance probe rather than a compatibility shim. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/ff41f6680a0ebbef2268cdb5daf253d4b400cb05/osv/malicious/npm/another-very-long-
another-very-long-name
source listed= 1.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (eea9e3cf3d973c07d09048435d4ddc496574ce222d650c228b1400d866ea3ccf) another-very-long-name@1.0.1 ships a beacon.cjs that is invoked both from the declared postinstall lifecycle script and from the module's require()-time entry (index.js). On execution it collects host identifiers — hostname, install path, process.cwd(), process.version, OS metadata, and the package name — and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded cleartext endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The package exposes no genuine functionality: index.js returns a Proxy whose get handler returns a no-op for every property so that bundlers consuming the package do not fail, and an author comment states that a build that completes and calls back is cleaner evidence. The destination is a bare-IP HTTP endpoint with no first-party relationship to any declared publisher, and the stub-plus-beacon shape is consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance probe rather than a compatibility shim. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/ff41f6680a0ebbef2268cdb5daf253d4b400cb05/osv/malicious/npm/another-very-long-
another-very-long-name
source listed= 2.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (eea9e3cf3d973c07d09048435d4ddc496574ce222d650c228b1400d866ea3ccf) another-very-long-name@1.0.1 ships a beacon.cjs that is invoked both from the declared postinstall lifecycle script and from the module's require()-time entry (index.js). On execution it collects host identifiers — hostname, install path, process.cwd(), process.version, OS metadata, and the package name — and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded cleartext endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The package exposes no genuine functionality: index.js returns a Proxy whose get handler returns a no-op for every property so that bundlers consuming the package do not fail, and an author comment states that a build that completes and calls back is cleaner evidence. The destination is a bare-IP HTTP endpoint with no first-party relationship to any declared publisher, and the stub-plus-beacon shape is consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance probe rather than a compatibility shim. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/ff41f6680a0ebbef2268cdb5daf253d4b400cb05/osv/malicious/npm/another-very-long-
another-very-long-name
source listed= 1.1.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (eea9e3cf3d973c07d09048435d4ddc496574ce222d650c228b1400d866ea3ccf) another-very-long-name@1.0.1 ships a beacon.cjs that is invoked both from the declared postinstall lifecycle script and from the module's require()-time entry (index.js). On execution it collects host identifiers — hostname, install path, process.cwd(), process.version, OS metadata, and the package name — and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded cleartext endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The package exposes no genuine functionality: index.js returns a Proxy whose get handler returns a no-op for every property so that bundlers consuming the package do not fail, and an author comment states that a build that completes and calls back is cleaner evidence. The destination is a bare-IP HTTP endpoint with no first-party relationship to any declared publisher, and the stub-plus-beacon shape is consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance probe rather than a compatibility shim. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/ff41f6680a0ebbef2268cdb5daf253d4b400cb05/osv/malicious/npm/another-very-long-
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-9w99-w8fq-2x8w ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.