supply chain event / NVI-00009759 / Revision 1
Malicious code in hardhat-option (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for hardhat-option. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
hardhat-option
source listed= 2.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (2d460f6c739361d793fbc66b2aa32d1d9ab6fe0df4caefe13c590f40d05d5277) The package's declared main index.js immediately requires./lib/config, which is a single-line ~4.5MB obfuscator.io-style bundle (26,234-entry hex-escaped string array, rotated decoder wrappers, control-flow flattening) whose top-level IIFE executes as soon as the module is loaded. The exported middleware is a no-op, so the sole effect of require('hardhat-option') is to run the opaque payload with the installer's privileges. The package also presents a false identity: the name is hardhat-option but README, index.d.ts and lib/* are copied from pinojs/pino and index.js re-exports module.exports.pino = middleware to satisfy consumers expecting pino's API, while package.json attributes authorship to 'Robert King ' with an unrelated bugs URL at jsonspack.com. A multi-megabyte, fully obfuscated module body that auto-executes on import inside a package falsely wrapped in another project's identity is the canonical loader/dropper shape. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/1f0efa038b4952b6
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-grmc-r4mm-h22m ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.