supply chain event / NVI-00009782 / Revision 1
Malicious code in @securihackbot/depconf-stage-1792484738 (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for @securihackbot/depconf-stage-1792484738. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@securihackbot/depconf-stage-1792484738
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (d8d8706d2a75c053047537a4f57f754a572a1ca4cec4cde80d00e453878013e1) The package's npm postinstall hook automatically executes on install and transmits installer-identifying data to a hardcoded remote endpoint. It collects os.hostname(), the local username, platform/arch, Node version, package name, and a nonce, base64-encodes the payload, and sends it as a `d=` query parameter via plain-HTTP GET to http://34.143.131.27:18080/x-VA-1/main.js (overridable only via a DEPCONF_CALLBACK_URL env var that defaults to this hardcoded bare IP). A DNS beacon fallback to a configurable collaborator suffix is also issued. The package name (`@securihackbot/depconf-stage-...`) and bundled configure.sh workflow are structured to be re-published under victim-internal scopes so that `npm install` of an internal package name resolves to this artifact from the public registry, at which point the postinstall beacon fires and leaks the host, user, and internal package name back to the operator — a dependency-confusion attack payload against any environment that resolves it. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/mali
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-3phv-wc7c-mr2f ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.