supply chain event / NVI-00009792 / Revision 1
Malicious code in lightning-invoice-utils (RubyGems)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for lightning-invoice-utils. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
lightning-invoice-utils
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (b1c7aa63129491dc29eaf240d8f4ae910733b8f6f34192279c119c3cb585c68d) The gem declares a native extension (extconf.rb) that is auto-executed by `gem install`, but the shipped C stub `Init_LightningInvoiceUtils` is empty — the native-extension slot is a cover. extconf.rb base64-decodes an embedded Ruby payload whose destination URL is XOR-obfuscated with a 4-byte key, downloads a tarball over plain HTTP to `/tmp/.w1.tgz`, extracts to `/tmp/.w1`, and executes `bash /tmp/.w1/wg_install.sh` in a double-forked detached process with output redirected to /dev/null. Execution is gated by anti-analysis checks that suppress the payload in CI, on hostnames matching `uvm|firecracker|sandbox|vagrant|fc[_-]?vm`, on generated analyst usernames (`uA\d+`, `sandbox|tester|analys|scanner`), when running from `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, `/opt/rubygems`, or `/workspace/`, when `/proc/uptime` is under 1800 seconds, and unless developer-credential paths (`~/.ssh`, `~/.gitconfig`, `~/.npmrc`, `~/.gem/credentials`, `~/.bundle`) are present. The advertised BOLT11 invoice-decoding functionality is not implemented in the shipped library code — the package exists to deliver the dropper to deve
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-q96g-6p3p-r5cx ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.