supply chain event / NVI-00009802 / Revision 1
Malicious code in @coopeuch/common (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for @coopeuch/common. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@coopeuch/common
source listed= 1.999.999
## Source: amazon-inspector (887c41c0805d7d223c499e702796cf46727b0be152b7c8a65607907afb3b5d59) @coopeuch/common@1.999.999 publishes to the public npm registry under a scope the publisher does not own, using an inflated version (1.999.999) consistent with the dependency-confusion technique that outranks internal-registry versions. The package's declared postinstall script (postinstall.js) runs automatically on npm install and collects installer-side host and network data — hostname, username, uid/gid, home directory, non-internal network interface addresses with MAC/CIDR, DNS resolver addresses, reverse-DNS internal FQDN, container markers, CI environment-variable presence, npm_config_registry, and the consuming project's package name/version/declared range — then POSTs it as JSON to the hardcoded author-controlled endpoint https://collector.oob.s4yhii.com/_npm-poc/beacon. A secondary DNS beacon is emitted via dns.lookup to a subdomain of oob.s4yhii.com. Any build that resolves @coopeuch/common from the public registry (including internal builds referencing the @coopeuch scope) will auto-exfiltrate internal hostnames, MAC addresses, usernames, internal registry URLs, and project ide
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-pcjv-x9w3-wc2g ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.