supply chain event / NVI-00009808 / Revision 1
Malicious code in staking-apr-fetcher (RubyGems)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for staking-apr-fetcher. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
staking-apr-fetcher
source listed= 0.9.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (405ab5b9651b8e8817ae91290042ec22673c5c99c1b58f45747e47cbb85aeacf) The gem declares a native extension whose build script (extconf.rb) decodes a base64-embedded Ruby payload and executes it via eval during `gem install`. The payload double-forks a detached background process that opens a TCP connection to the hardcoded host 45.138.12.177:8089 and bidirectionally copies between that socket and a locally spawned /bin/sh, giving the operator of that endpoint interactive shell access on the installer's machine. Execution is gated by anti-analysis checks: the payload only fires when the environment does not look like CI, an ephemeral/sandbox VM (patterns matching uvm/firecracker/sandbox/vagrant), a generated analyst user (patterns matching uA\d+/sandbox/tester/analys/scanner), or a known analysis path (/opt/rubygems, /tmp/, /workspace/), and only when system uptime exceeds 1800 seconds and developer-identifying files exist (~/.ssh, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.gem/credentials, ~/.bundle, ~/.npmrc). The gem's advertised identity is a cover story: it is published as `staking-apr-fetcher` with a staking-related summary, but the README is titled `bitcoin-rpc-lite`, the exten
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-5wxm-jv9m-mw2r ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.