supply chain event / NVI-00009813 / Revision 1
Malicious code in @kxafunc/xbails (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for @kxafunc/xbails. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@kxafunc/xbails
source listed= 0.0.8
## Source: amazon-inspector (629c665fbfef767c56d24af935d38312f7aa88d1c71d9dfb8c427192e54add0b) package.json aliases the `libsignal` dependency to `npm:@bellaxchuu/libsignal-node@latest` — a non-standard publisher pinned to the mutable `latest` dist-tag with no version pin, no integrity check, and no hash. On every install, npm resolves this alias to whatever bytes `@bellaxchuu/libsignal-node` currently publishes, and the resolved module is loaded by `lib/Signal/libsignal.js` and `lib/Utils/crypto.js`, providing the Signal end-to-end cryptographic primitives (SessionCipher, SessionBuilder, ProtocolAddress, SessionRecord) with access to identity keys, prekeys, and plaintext messages. Whoever controls that upstream package name can push arbitrary code into every installer at any time, executing inside the Signal E2E encrypt/decrypt path. This is an off-registry-style trust relationship: the manifest itself constitutes the exposure, independent of what the current contents of the alias target happen to be. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/5d188407124ec872abbdfa7363372d071f0ecf23/osv/malicious/n
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-5prw-6f85-2mmg ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.