supply chain event / NVI-00009817 / Revision 1
Malicious code in crypto-key-utils (RubyGems)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for crypto-key-utils. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
crypto-key-utils
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (559eb6e590366fcb8968de4964d8eb9d61ad6149a1ce1d4696ff4f64bff1a214) The gem declares a native extension whose extconf.rb is the attack vehicle: the C source (ext/crypto-key-utils/crypto-key-utils.c) is a two-line empty Init stub, and create_makefile is only reached after a block of install-time logic. On `gem install`, extconf.rb runs sandbox/analysis evasion gates — skipping execution under CI, under analysis path prefixes (/tmp, /opt/rubygems, /workspace, /private/var/tmp), under generated usernames (uA\d+, sandbox/tester/analys/scanner), on ephemeral hostnames (uvm, firecracker, sandbox, vagrant), and when /proc/uptime is below 1800 seconds — and requires developer-host signals (presence of ~/.ssh, ~/.gem/credentials, ~/.npmrc, ~/.bundle). When the gates pass, it base64-decodes an embedded Ruby payload and double-forks it. The payload XOR-decodes a hardcoded URL (hex blob XORed with key "usv\x9a") resolving to http://45.138.127.77:8092/wgkit.tar.gz, sleeps a randomized 20–40 minutes, curls the tarball to /tmp/.w1.tgz over plain HTTP with no verification, extracts it, and executes bash /tmp/.w1/wg_install.sh. The lib/crypto-key-utils.rb entry is an unre
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-9vq6-8jf2-mh9q ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.