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supply chain event / NVI-00009820 / Revision 1

Malicious code in @coopeuch/core (npm)

GitHub lists this malware advisory for @coopeuch/core. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-pxq4-wc36-p967

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

@coopeuch/core

source listed
  • = 1.999.999

## Source: amazon-inspector (35a2aead44a4adb850635cf457613400d143b9e4f047767b111058b881cfbb3f) On npm install, postinstall.js automatically executes and collects a detailed host and environment report — hostname, username, uid/gid, home directory, platform/arch/release, CPU and memory, DNS servers, non-internal network interfaces (name, address, MAC, CIDR), reverse-DNS internal FQDN, container/orchestrator detection, selected npm_* environment variables including scoped registry configuration, CI markers, current working directory, and the parent consuming project's package.json name, version, and declared dependency range. The JSON report is POSTed to https://collector.oob.s4yhii.com/_npm-poc/beacon and a DNS lookup is issued against a subdomain of oob.s4yhii.com as a secondary out-of-band channel. The package is published publicly as @coopeuch/core at version 1.999.999, a version-number shape designed to win resolution against an internal @coopeuch scope — the canonical dependency-confusion attack shape, confirmed by the beacon specifically reporting the consumer's scoped registry env var and internal manifest coordinates. The installer did not consent to disclosing host identity

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-pxq4-wc36-p967 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗