supply chain event / NVI-00009830 / Revision 1
Malicious code in ph-common (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for ph-common, ph-common, ph-common, ph-common, ph-common. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
ph-common
source listed= 77.7.7
## Source: amazon-inspector (f82053e651a1ec7ee7cdf8ecd57ca4be012f7ce8d60dec081f99c2b80cb66bf2) The package is a stub whose index.js exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for every property access, so consumers that import it receive a non-functional module. The only functional code is beacon.cjs, which POSTs the installer's hostname, install path (__dirname), cwd, and Node version as JSON to the hardcoded bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The beacon fires both from the package.json postinstall lifecycle hook (`node beacon.cjs`) and at import time via a top-level `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` in index.js. The destination is unrelated to any publisher infrastructure, uses a bare IP over cleartext HTTP, and the comments framing the payload as 'only machine/package metadata' do not change that unsolicited host identifiers are being sent off-host on install and on require. The stub-plus-beacon shape is consistent with a dependency-confusion or name-squat reconnaissance probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/28e8e300c79177f2cb1eb131ae981c3c0e639495/osv/malici
ph-common
source listed= 1.1.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (f82053e651a1ec7ee7cdf8ecd57ca4be012f7ce8d60dec081f99c2b80cb66bf2) The package is a stub whose index.js exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for every property access, so consumers that import it receive a non-functional module. The only functional code is beacon.cjs, which POSTs the installer's hostname, install path (__dirname), cwd, and Node version as JSON to the hardcoded bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The beacon fires both from the package.json postinstall lifecycle hook (`node beacon.cjs`) and at import time via a top-level `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` in index.js. The destination is unrelated to any publisher infrastructure, uses a bare IP over cleartext HTTP, and the comments framing the payload as 'only machine/package metadata' do not change that unsolicited host identifiers are being sent off-host on install and on require. The stub-plus-beacon shape is consistent with a dependency-confusion or name-squat reconnaissance probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/28e8e300c79177f2cb1eb131ae981c3c0e639495/osv/malici
ph-common
source listed= 0.1.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (f82053e651a1ec7ee7cdf8ecd57ca4be012f7ce8d60dec081f99c2b80cb66bf2) The package is a stub whose index.js exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for every property access, so consumers that import it receive a non-functional module. The only functional code is beacon.cjs, which POSTs the installer's hostname, install path (__dirname), cwd, and Node version as JSON to the hardcoded bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The beacon fires both from the package.json postinstall lifecycle hook (`node beacon.cjs`) and at import time via a top-level `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` in index.js. The destination is unrelated to any publisher infrastructure, uses a bare IP over cleartext HTTP, and the comments framing the payload as 'only machine/package metadata' do not change that unsolicited host identifiers are being sent off-host on install and on require. The stub-plus-beacon shape is consistent with a dependency-confusion or name-squat reconnaissance probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/28e8e300c79177f2cb1eb131ae981c3c0e639495/osv/malici
ph-common
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (f82053e651a1ec7ee7cdf8ecd57ca4be012f7ce8d60dec081f99c2b80cb66bf2) The package is a stub whose index.js exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for every property access, so consumers that import it receive a non-functional module. The only functional code is beacon.cjs, which POSTs the installer's hostname, install path (__dirname), cwd, and Node version as JSON to the hardcoded bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The beacon fires both from the package.json postinstall lifecycle hook (`node beacon.cjs`) and at import time via a top-level `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` in index.js. The destination is unrelated to any publisher infrastructure, uses a bare IP over cleartext HTTP, and the comments framing the payload as 'only machine/package metadata' do not change that unsolicited host identifiers are being sent off-host on install and on require. The stub-plus-beacon shape is consistent with a dependency-confusion or name-squat reconnaissance probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/28e8e300c79177f2cb1eb131ae981c3c0e639495/osv/malici
ph-common
source listed= 99.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (f82053e651a1ec7ee7cdf8ecd57ca4be012f7ce8d60dec081f99c2b80cb66bf2) The package is a stub whose index.js exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for every property access, so consumers that import it receive a non-functional module. The only functional code is beacon.cjs, which POSTs the installer's hostname, install path (__dirname), cwd, and Node version as JSON to the hardcoded bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The beacon fires both from the package.json postinstall lifecycle hook (`node beacon.cjs`) and at import time via a top-level `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` in index.js. The destination is unrelated to any publisher infrastructure, uses a bare IP over cleartext HTTP, and the comments framing the payload as 'only machine/package metadata' do not change that unsolicited host identifiers are being sent off-host on install and on require. The stub-plus-beacon shape is consistent with a dependency-confusion or name-squat reconnaissance probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/28e8e300c79177f2cb1eb131ae981c3c0e639495/osv/malici
ph-common
source listed= 2.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (f82053e651a1ec7ee7cdf8ecd57ca4be012f7ce8d60dec081f99c2b80cb66bf2) The package is a stub whose index.js exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for every property access, so consumers that import it receive a non-functional module. The only functional code is beacon.cjs, which POSTs the installer's hostname, install path (__dirname), cwd, and Node version as JSON to the hardcoded bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The beacon fires both from the package.json postinstall lifecycle hook (`node beacon.cjs`) and at import time via a top-level `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` in index.js. The destination is unrelated to any publisher infrastructure, uses a bare IP over cleartext HTTP, and the comments framing the payload as 'only machine/package metadata' do not change that unsolicited host identifiers are being sent off-host on install and on require. The stub-plus-beacon shape is consistent with a dependency-confusion or name-squat reconnaissance probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/28e8e300c79177f2cb1eb131ae981c3c0e639495/osv/malici
ph-common
source listed= 1.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (f82053e651a1ec7ee7cdf8ecd57ca4be012f7ce8d60dec081f99c2b80cb66bf2) The package is a stub whose index.js exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for every property access, so consumers that import it receive a non-functional module. The only functional code is beacon.cjs, which POSTs the installer's hostname, install path (__dirname), cwd, and Node version as JSON to the hardcoded bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The beacon fires both from the package.json postinstall lifecycle hook (`node beacon.cjs`) and at import time via a top-level `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` in index.js. The destination is unrelated to any publisher infrastructure, uses a bare IP over cleartext HTTP, and the comments framing the payload as 'only machine/package metadata' do not change that unsolicited host identifiers are being sent off-host on install and on require. The stub-plus-beacon shape is consistent with a dependency-confusion or name-squat reconnaissance probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/28e8e300c79177f2cb1eb131ae981c3c0e639495/osv/malici
ph-common
source listed= 3.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (f82053e651a1ec7ee7cdf8ecd57ca4be012f7ce8d60dec081f99c2b80cb66bf2) The package is a stub whose index.js exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for every property access, so consumers that import it receive a non-functional module. The only functional code is beacon.cjs, which POSTs the installer's hostname, install path (__dirname), cwd, and Node version as JSON to the hardcoded bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The beacon fires both from the package.json postinstall lifecycle hook (`node beacon.cjs`) and at import time via a top-level `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` in index.js. The destination is unrelated to any publisher infrastructure, uses a bare IP over cleartext HTTP, and the comments framing the payload as 'only machine/package metadata' do not change that unsolicited host identifiers are being sent off-host on install and on require. The stub-plus-beacon shape is consistent with a dependency-confusion or name-squat reconnaissance probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/28e8e300c79177f2cb1eb131ae981c3c0e639495/osv/malici
ph-common
source listed= 2.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (f82053e651a1ec7ee7cdf8ecd57ca4be012f7ce8d60dec081f99c2b80cb66bf2) The package is a stub whose index.js exports a Proxy returning no-op functions for every property access, so consumers that import it receive a non-functional module. The only functional code is beacon.cjs, which POSTs the installer's hostname, install path (__dirname), cwd, and Node version as JSON to the hardcoded bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The beacon fires both from the package.json postinstall lifecycle hook (`node beacon.cjs`) and at import time via a top-level `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` in index.js. The destination is unrelated to any publisher infrastructure, uses a bare IP over cleartext HTTP, and the comments framing the payload as 'only machine/package metadata' do not change that unsolicited host identifiers are being sent off-host on install and on require. The stub-plus-beacon shape is consistent with a dependency-confusion or name-squat reconnaissance probe. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/28e8e300c79177f2cb1eb131ae981c3c0e639495/osv/malici
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-g6x8-wj65-55v2 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.