supply chain event / NVI-00009852 / Revision 1
Malicious code in tailwind-animatecss-uniform (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for tailwind-animatecss-uniform. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
tailwind-animatecss-uniform
source listed= 2.0.7
tailwind-animatecss-uniform 2.0.7 was published to npm on 2026-09-28 by the account ares0320. The package is part of a fake job interview campaign that targets developers, using the same method as the "Contagious Interview" campaign. A fake company sends a take-home coding assessment repository. The repository commits a web/.npmrc containing a plaintext npm auth token, and its tailwind.config.js loads this package as a Tailwind CSS plugin. The package presents itself as an Animate.css integration ("A configurable, namespaced Animate.css integration for Tailwind CSS", main plugin.js) but declares a runtime dependency on a private scoped npm package (@jasperquinn/postcss-motion-helpers) that is not publicly readable, so npm audit and public scanners cannot see it; it only resolves with the token committed in the lure repository. The package has no install scripts, so --ignore-scripts does not help: the code runs when Tailwind loads the config, i.e. on `npm run dev` / `next dev`. Public analysis of the earlier package in this chain (animatecss-tailwind-adapter, by Yunus Aydın) reports that the private package contacts an operator-controlled server and runs the code it receives with fu
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-p4jm-3r8q-f3v4 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.