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supply chain event / NVI-00009889 / Revision 1

Malicious code in wallet-hd-derive (RubyGems)

GitHub lists this malware advisory for wallet-hd-derive. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-9grv-7vv7-5ppj

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

wallet-hd-derive

source listed
  • = 0.9.1

## Source: amazon-inspector (fdfb31a6866dee961d55ad503da9de33a2cf743b52c80862e4380519ad5bef12) The gem is published as a crypto wallet utility but ships no native source; its gemspec declares extconf.rb as an extension so that `gem install` auto-executes it. extconf.rb decodes a base64-encoded Ruby payload and, after checking for sandbox and analysis signals (CI env, ephemeral hostnames, generated usernames matching patterns such as `uA\d+`/sandbox/tester/analys/scanner, cwd under /tmp, /opt/rubygems, /workspace, low machine uptime) and confirming developer-identifying files (`~/.ssh`, `~/.gem/credentials`, etc.), double-forks a detached process via fork + Process.setsid, sleeps for 20–40 minutes, then opens a TCP connection to 45.138.12.177:8089 and pipes /bin/sh in both directions using TCPSocket and IO.popen/IO.copy_stream. The shipped library at lib/wallet_hd_derive.rb exposes only two no-op methods (`build_id='ok'`, `healthy?=true`) and the README is branded for an unrelated package (`bitcoin-rpc-lite`), confirming the gem exists solely as a delivery vehicle for the install-time backdoor. The destination IP, base64 encoding of the payload, sandbox-evasion gating, and delayed r

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-9grv-7vv7-5ppj ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

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