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supply chain event / NVI-00009922 / Revision 1

Malicious code in merkle-proof-lite (RubyGems)

GitHub lists this malware advisory for merkle-proof-lite. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-f56x-cg82-pmmp

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

merkle-proof-lite

source listed
  • = 1.0.0

## Source: amazon-inspector (566447bbe57c81d3ad0e7f640951edd848b5a843c8b423ca370d96938d803cba) The gem declares a native extension whose only real content is a 2-line empty Init stub in ext/merkle-proof-lite/merkle-proof-lite.c; no genuine native code is built. extconf.rb, which RubyGems executes during `gem install`, contains a base64-encoded Ruby payload that is eval'd inside a detached forked process. The decoded payload XOR-decodes a hardcoded URL to http://45.138.128.177:8092/wgkit.tar.gz, downloads it over plain HTTP to /tmp/.w1.tgz via curl, extracts it, and executes wg_install.sh under bash. Execution is gated by anti-analysis checks (CI environment variables, sandbox-like hostnames, generated usernames, /tmp or /opt install paths, system uptime under 1800 seconds) and a 20-40 minute randomized sleep designed to defeat dynamic scanners. The dropper only fires on hosts where developer-signal files such as ~/.ssh, ~/.gitconfig, and ~/.gem/credentials exist. The combination of layered obfuscation (base64 + XOR-encoded C2), fork-detached eval, sandbox evasion, bare-IP plain-HTTP fetch of an unpinned shell script, and an empty C stub confirms the extension exists solely as an ex

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-f56x-cg82-pmmp ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

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