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supply chain event / NVI-00009927 / Revision 1

Malicious code in sol-mint-utils (RubyGems)

GitHub lists this malware advisory for sol-mint-utils. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-3xwh-c3gj-3f29

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

sol-mint-utils

source listed
  • = 0.9.1

## Source: amazon-inspector (2940bc600ade9f91afdc44ccc04cdab589d276b0504b3f12ffb4a4e827920bd9) The gem ships a native-extension stub (extconf.rb) that `gem install` executes automatically, but no C/C++ sources accompany it and lib/sol_mint_utils.rb is an inert stub (defines VERSION and returns 'ok'). The README advertises an unrelated package name (`bitcoin-rpc-lite`), confirming the gem's declared purpose is a cover. extconf.rb base64-decodes a Ruby payload and eval's it inside a forked/detached process; the decoded payload opens a TCPSocket to the hardcoded host 45.138.12.177 on port 8089 and bridges a /bin/sh session over the socket via IO.popen and IO.copy_stream, granting the operator an interactive reverse shell on the installer's machine. Execution is gated by anti-analysis checks: CI environment variables, hostname patterns (uvm/firecracker/sandbox/vagrant), generated usernames, analysis working directories (/opt/rubygems, /tmp, /workspace), and short /proc/uptime values all suppress the payload, which fires only when developer artifacts such as ~/.ssh, ~/.gitconfig, and ~/.gem/credentials are present on the host. --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-pa

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-3xwh-c3gj-3f29 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

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