supply chain event / NVI-00009951 / Revision 1
Malicious code in @dransay/db (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for @dransay/db. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@dransay/db
source listed= 99.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (dc3d55a63787b5f45312d0b8433f6e782b2a6b28e89ef6377e24e5d26c757a61) On npm install, the package's preinstall hook executes beacon.js, which performs a DNS lookup and HTTPS GET to a hardcoded interactsh (OAST) subdomain under oast.site, embedding the package name in the path. The implausibly high version number (99.0.0) combined with the generic scope-plus-name is the canonical shape of a dependency-confusion probe: publish a public package reusing an internal name at a version high enough to win resolution, and record every host that resolves it. Each install leaks the installer's egress IP and the fact that an internal-named package was pulled from the public registry to a third-party-controlled collector, confirming to the operator that the target organization is exploitable for a follow-on malicious release under the same name. No installer secrets, environment variables, or filesystem contents are read, and no remote code is executed from the response, but the beacon itself materializes attacker benefit (reconnaissance of vulnerable internal names) at install time. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://g
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-gf65-f25f-jwqv ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.