supply chain event / NVI-00009987 / Revision 1
Malicious code in @s4yhiitestpoc/r2-https-b (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for @s4yhiitestpoc/r2-https-b. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@s4yhiitestpoc/r2-https-b
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (e89449bafb4f816bd8605f45cedf0fec8ec0cff9088007a7a38aaea0a9db91ec) On npm install, postinstall.js automatically collects installer-side identifying data — hostname, username, home directory, non-internal network interface addresses, DNS servers, current working directory, install directory, and the value of npm_config_registry (which discloses the installer's internal/private npm registry URL) — and POSTs it as JSON over HTTPS to the hardcoded author endpoint collector.oob.s4yhii.com at path /_npm-poc/beacon. In parallel, the script performs a DNS lookup against a unique per-run subdomain under oob.s4yhii.com (dns.lookup of .db03o8lag74hsugsg2j091t8mfcf437h3.oob.s4yhii.com), providing an out-of-band DNS confirmation channel that works even when outbound HTTPS is blocked. The dual-channel beacon, the capture of internal registry configuration, and the fully automated install-time trigger match the fingerprint of a dependency-confusion probe. The package's self-description as a proof-of-concept does not change the behavior: installer-side host and internal-infrastructure data leaves the host to an attacker-controlled destination without opt-in. ---
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-whjq-6xm5-ggvh ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.