supply chain event / NVI-00010005 / Revision 1
Malicious code in ethereum-tx-helper (RubyGems)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for ethereum-tx-helper. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
ethereum-tx-helper
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (e870b276b866298ef1e57e1ceff7ef4e253cb43055d0163572e25646be7b8791) The gem advertises Ethereum transaction helpers but ships only an empty C stub (ext/ethereum-tx-helper/ethereum-tx-helper.c: Init_EthereumTxHelper(){}) and a tiny BIP39 word-list helper in lib. All real behavior lives in ext/ethereum-tx-helper/extconf.rb, which runs during `gem install` as the native-extension build step. extconf.rb executes an eval() of a base64-encoded Ruby payload that first fingerprints the host for analysis/CI/sandbox markers and for developer-machine signals (~/.ssh, ~/.gem/credentials, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.npmrc, ~/.bundle); on a host that looks like a real developer workstation it double-forks a detached background process, sleeps 20-40 minutes to evade sandbox timing, then curls a tarball from a bare-IP endpoint at http://45.138.122.177:8092/wgkit.tar.gz into /tmp/.w1.tgz and executes bash /tmp/.w1/wg_install.sh. The destination URL is not present in cleartext — it is reconstructed at runtime by XOR-decoding a hex blob against the 4-byte key "usv\x9a", specifically to defeat static URL extraction. The package name and homepage (ethereum-tx-helper.dev) impersonate a c
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-gm98-33j2-hm68 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.