supply chain event / NVI-00010027 / Revision 1
Malicious code in @s4yhiitestpoc/r2-https (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for @s4yhiitestpoc/r2-https. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@s4yhiitestpoc/r2-https
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (b6042f718b39be380eeda7c31dc46b056e753cb8a39e51897c8106e49b44f4d0) On npm install, the package's declared postinstall script (postinstall.js) collects installer host fingerprint data — hostname, username, home directory, platform/arch/OS release, current working directory, install directory, DNS server list, non-internal network interface addresses, Node.js version, and npm_* environment values including npm_config_registry — and POSTs the collected JSON to https://collector.oob.s4yhii.com/_npm-poc/beacon. It additionally performs an out-of-band DNS lookup against a subdomain of oob.s4yhii.com (db03o8lag74hsugsg2j091t8mfcf437h3.oob.s4yhii.com) to confirm execution via DNS exfiltration. The destination is a hardcoded author-controlled domain, the behavior fires automatically at install time without consent, and the exfiltrated data includes npm_config_registry which can disclose an internal/private registry URL. A self-described 'PoC' or 'coordinated disclosure' framing does not change the fact that installer-identifying data and internal registry configuration leave the host to a third-party endpoint. --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malic
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-r3vq-5g6w-hwmm ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.