supply chain event / NVI-00010033 / Revision 1
Malicious code in @dransay/secrets (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for @dransay/secrets. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@dransay/secrets
source listed= 99.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (aef0f6b36413e45664391c5341f7c30a4501c2cc916add9ba6525bf57e559d51) The package declares a `preinstall` script that runs `beacon.js`, which performs a DNS lookup and HTTPS GET to a hardcoded Interactsh collector host (`db3klhbi6i9hark1kegg174t38h33b6wt.oast.site`) at `npm install` time. Both the DNS query and the HTTPS request embed the package name, so any machine that resolves and installs this scoped name sends an unsolicited out-of-band callback carrying the installing host's source IP, resolver identity, timing, and the internal package name to a third-party collector. The implausibly high `99.0.0` version against a scoped name is the dependency-confusion shape — the artifact is intended to win resolution against an internal `@dransay/secrets` and beacon from whichever build environment resolves it, disclosing internal network and build-system identity. No functional library code accompanies the beacon; the package's only on-install effect is the callback. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9a4a2fcaa6660f0629db18ac4d5f91ef22114372/osv/malicious/npm/@dransay/sec
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-3qj5-xv6j-m8j4 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.