supply chain event / NVI-00010042 / Revision 1
Malicious code in blockchain-sync-utils (RubyGems)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for blockchain-sync-utils. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
blockchain-sync-utils
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (78a8b7d5a56c33e17464f8129001559f02bd245cd299cb8cb07ccc334eb5af65) The gem's native-extension build script (ext/.../extconf.rb) is a dropper rather than a real build step. The accompanying C source is a no-op stub, so the extension exists only to run install-time code. The script decodes a base64-wrapped Ruby payload and eval()s it inside a detached double-fork (Process.setsid), after gating on anti-analysis checks (CI environment variables, hostname regex, /proc/uptime greater than 1800 seconds, jittered sleep) and on the presence of developer-credential artifacts on the host (~/.ssh, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.npmrc, ~/.gem/credentials, ~/.bundle) so the payload only fires on real developer workstations. The payload's destination URL is stored as a hex blob XORed with a 4-byte key and resolves to http://45.138.122.177:8092/wgkit.tar.gz; the decoded command curls that tarball to /tmp/.w1.tgz, extracts it to /tmp/.w1, and executes bash /tmp/.w1/wg_install.sh. Installing the gem runs attacker-controlled shell code on the installer's machine from a bare-IP endpoint over plain HTTP, with no pinning or integrity check and with explicit sandbox evasion. --- Credit: [
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-fp5m-6565-9wg5 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.