vulnerability / NVI-00010110 / Revision 4
Electron: openExternal permission requests can be attributed to the wrong origin
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for electron, electron, electron, electron. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
5.4 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.219%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.12409. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
electron
source listed< 42.11.3
### Impact Requests to open external protocol URLs could be attributed to a document other than the one that asked for them, so the `requestingUrl` passed to `session.setPermissionRequestHandler` was a trusted origin for a launch untrusted content had requested. An origin-based handler could therefore let untrusted content launch an OS-registered external application. Apps are only affected if they grant `openExternal` based on the requesting origin and let untrusted content open or navigate windows. Apps whose permission handler denies `openExternal` for untrusted content are not affected. ### Workarounds Deny the `openExternal` permission for untrusted content, or deny the windows it opens with `setWindowOpenHandler`. ### Fixed Versions * `45.0.0-alpha.5` * `44.3.0` * `43.7.0` * `42.11.3` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org
electron
source listed>= 43.0.0-alpha.1, < 43.7.0
### Impact Requests to open external protocol URLs could be attributed to a document other than the one that asked for them, so the `requestingUrl` passed to `session.setPermissionRequestHandler` was a trusted origin for a launch untrusted content had requested. An origin-based handler could therefore let untrusted content launch an OS-registered external application. Apps are only affected if they grant `openExternal` based on the requesting origin and let untrusted content open or navigate windows. Apps whose permission handler denies `openExternal` for untrusted content are not affected. ### Workarounds Deny the `openExternal` permission for untrusted content, or deny the windows it opens with `setWindowOpenHandler`. ### Fixed Versions * `45.0.0-alpha.5` * `44.3.0` * `43.7.0` * `42.11.3` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org
electron
source listed>= 44.0.0-alpha.1, < 44.3.0
### Impact Requests to open external protocol URLs could be attributed to a document other than the one that asked for them, so the `requestingUrl` passed to `session.setPermissionRequestHandler` was a trusted origin for a launch untrusted content had requested. An origin-based handler could therefore let untrusted content launch an OS-registered external application. Apps are only affected if they grant `openExternal` based on the requesting origin and let untrusted content open or navigate windows. Apps whose permission handler denies `openExternal` for untrusted content are not affected. ### Workarounds Deny the `openExternal` permission for untrusted content, or deny the windows it opens with `setWindowOpenHandler`. ### Fixed Versions * `45.0.0-alpha.5` * `44.3.0` * `43.7.0` * `42.11.3` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org
electron
source listed>= 45.0.0-alpha.1, < 45.0.0-alpha.5
### Impact Requests to open external protocol URLs could be attributed to a document other than the one that asked for them, so the `requestingUrl` passed to `session.setPermissionRequestHandler` was a trusted origin for a launch untrusted content had requested. An origin-based handler could therefore let untrusted content launch an OS-registered external application. Apps are only affected if they grant `openExternal` based on the requesting origin and let untrusted content open or navigate windows. Apps whose permission handler denies `openExternal` for untrusted content are not affected. ### Workarounds Deny the `openExternal` permission for untrusted content, or deny the windows it opens with `setWindowOpenHandler`. ### Fixed Versions * `45.0.0-alpha.5` * `44.3.0` * `43.7.0` * `42.11.3` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org
electron
source listedSEMVER: introduced 0; fixed 42.11.3
### Impact Requests to open external protocol URLs could be attributed to a document other than the one that asked for them, so the `requestingUrl` passed to `session.setPermissionRequestHandler` was a trusted origin for a launch untrusted content had requested. An origin-based handler could therefore let untrusted content launch an OS-registered external application. Apps are only affected if they grant `openExternal` based on the requesting origin and let untrusted content open or navigate windows. Apps whose permission handler denies `openExternal` for untrusted content are not affected. ### Workarounds Deny the `openExternal` permission for untrusted content, or deny the windows it opens with `setWindowOpenHandler`. ### Fixed Versions * `45.0.0-alpha.5` * `44.3.0` * `43.7.0` * `42.11.3` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org
electron
source listedSEMVER: introduced 43.0.0-alpha.1; fixed 43.7.0
### Impact Requests to open external protocol URLs could be attributed to a document other than the one that asked for them, so the `requestingUrl` passed to `session.setPermissionRequestHandler` was a trusted origin for a launch untrusted content had requested. An origin-based handler could therefore let untrusted content launch an OS-registered external application. Apps are only affected if they grant `openExternal` based on the requesting origin and let untrusted content open or navigate windows. Apps whose permission handler denies `openExternal` for untrusted content are not affected. ### Workarounds Deny the `openExternal` permission for untrusted content, or deny the windows it opens with `setWindowOpenHandler`. ### Fixed Versions * `45.0.0-alpha.5` * `44.3.0` * `43.7.0` * `42.11.3` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org
electron
source listedSEMVER: introduced 44.0.0-alpha.1; fixed 44.3.0
### Impact Requests to open external protocol URLs could be attributed to a document other than the one that asked for them, so the `requestingUrl` passed to `session.setPermissionRequestHandler` was a trusted origin for a launch untrusted content had requested. An origin-based handler could therefore let untrusted content launch an OS-registered external application. Apps are only affected if they grant `openExternal` based on the requesting origin and let untrusted content open or navigate windows. Apps whose permission handler denies `openExternal` for untrusted content are not affected. ### Workarounds Deny the `openExternal` permission for untrusted content, or deny the windows it opens with `setWindowOpenHandler`. ### Fixed Versions * `45.0.0-alpha.5` * `44.3.0` * `43.7.0` * `42.11.3` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org
electron
source listedSEMVER: introduced 45.0.0-alpha.1; fixed 45.0.0-alpha.5
### Impact Requests to open external protocol URLs could be attributed to a document other than the one that asked for them, so the `requestingUrl` passed to `session.setPermissionRequestHandler` was a trusted origin for a launch untrusted content had requested. An origin-based handler could therefore let untrusted content launch an OS-registered external application. Apps are only affected if they grant `openExternal` based on the requesting origin and let untrusted content open or navigate windows. Apps whose permission handler denies `openExternal` for untrusted content are not affected. ### Workarounds Deny the `openExternal` permission for untrusted content, or deny the windows it opens with `setWindowOpenHandler`. ### Fixed Versions * `45.0.0-alpha.5` * `44.3.0` * `43.7.0` * `42.11.3` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 42.11.3 for electron. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 43.7.0 for electron. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 44.3.0 for electron. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 45.0.0-alpha.5 for electron. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-997q-gvvc-jwmx ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-997q-gvvc-jwmx ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-114121 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 4 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.