vulnerability / NVI-00010132 / Revision 3
GraphQL-core: Denial of service via comment tokens bypassing the parser's max_tokens limit
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for graphql-core, graphql-core. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.573%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.47349. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
graphql-core
source listed>= 3.2.3, < 3.2.12
### Summary The parser's `max_tokens` limit — the documented defence against oversized GraphQL documents — did not count comment tokens. A document padded with comments could therefore pass a `max_tokens` check of any size while still allocating one `Token` object per comment, all of which stay reachable for the lifetime of the parsed document. A 38 MB comment-padded payload allocated roughly 92 MB of additional resident memory with `max_tokens=5` in force. ### Details `Lexer.lookahead()` reads tokens one at a time and skips over comments, returning only the first non-comment token. Each skipped comment is nevertheless fully tokenized, allocated as a `Token` object, and linked into the persistent token list via `token.next` / `token.prev` — the chain that powers source-location reporting, and which is retained as long as the document is. `Parser.advance_lexer()` incremented the token counter only for the tokens the lexer actually returned. Comments were therefore invisible to the accounting, and `max_tokens` bounded only the *non-comment* tokens. The practical consequence is a gap between what users reasonably believe `max_tokens` protects and what it did protect. The limit wa
graphql-core
source listed>= 3.3.0a3, < 3.3.0rc1
### Summary The parser's `max_tokens` limit — the documented defence against oversized GraphQL documents — did not count comment tokens. A document padded with comments could therefore pass a `max_tokens` check of any size while still allocating one `Token` object per comment, all of which stay reachable for the lifetime of the parsed document. A 38 MB comment-padded payload allocated roughly 92 MB of additional resident memory with `max_tokens=5` in force. ### Details `Lexer.lookahead()` reads tokens one at a time and skips over comments, returning only the first non-comment token. Each skipped comment is nevertheless fully tokenized, allocated as a `Token` object, and linked into the persistent token list via `token.next` / `token.prev` — the chain that powers source-location reporting, and which is retained as long as the document is. `Parser.advance_lexer()` incremented the token counter only for the tokens the lexer actually returned. Comments were therefore invisible to the accounting, and `max_tokens` bounded only the *non-comment* tokens. The practical consequence is a gap between what users reasonably believe `max_tokens` protects and what it did protect. The limit wa
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-r77w-qph3-7vf8 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-75508 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.