supply chain event / NVI-00010494 / Revision 1
Malicious code in hardhat-init (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for hardhat-init. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
hardhat-init
source listed= 2.21.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (e2f570102756d04aa466677488cd13aacac2eb941176523bc4ff024d214affbb) The npm package hardhat-init presents itself as Hardhat initialization tooling and ships a README, LICENSE, and index.d.ts copied from the pino logger project with the name substituted. The main entry index.js requires./lib/config at the top level, which triggers a ~4.3MB heavily obfuscated JavaScript file (lib/config.js) whose top-level IIFE executes immediately on module load. The obfuscation uses hex-escaped string tables, nested index-lookup helpers, and a string-array shuffler consistent with obfuscator.io output, with no plaintext surface describing the behavior. The exported index.js is a trivial no-op that does not consume anything from lib/config, so the sole effect of loading the package is to execute the opaque payload. The combination of a name/content mismatch (hardhat-init vs. copied pino scaffolding), an oversized obfuscated sibling file with no legitimate purpose for an init helper, and auto-execution on require is a typosquat loader shape that causes arbitrary attacker-controlled code to run on the installer's machine the first time any consumer imports the package. ---
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-w6mp-phr7-c2v5 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.