supply chain event / NVI-00010510 / Revision 1
Malicious code in @dransay/logger (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for @dransay/logger. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@dransay/logger
source listed= 99.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (5d4cbd17edce3b0c45619c9af869321807357e3dae1af8aa94835d3143185e85) The package @dransay/logger@99.0.0 ships a preinstall hook (`node beacon.js`) that fires on `npm install`. The script performs a DNS lookup and HTTPS GET to the interactsh collaborator host `db3klhbi6i9hark1kegg174t38h33b6wt.oast.site`, encoding the package name in the subdomain/path. The version number (99.0.0) is implausibly high for a package with no release history, consistent with a dependency-confusion squat intended to win semver resolution against a private internal name. On install, the beacon discloses the installer's source IP, DNS resolver, and timestamp to a third-party host under the scoped name `@dransay/logger`, confirming successful resolution of this public package in an environment that may have intended to resolve a private `@dransay/*` package. No further payload is executed in this version, but the install-time callback to an attacker-controlled OAST endpoint is the reconnaissance stage of a dependency-confusion attack. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9a4a2fcaa6660f0629db18a
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-7v9w-pmg3-8ww9 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.